*Note: I initially wrote this two weeks ago and thought that I had published it then. Whoops. See the post below to find my day-before-the-draft thoughts.
I can't believe I'm actually writing this. But a wave has swept through Cubs fan sites proposing what would otherwise be an efficient approach to the draft if it wasn't so crazy. The rationale goes something like this:
Seeing as this is a three pitcher draft, the Cubs need a pitcher, and the Cubs pick fourth, the Cubs should cut a massively underslot deal with a player at #4 in order to save money and grab a falling prospect in Rounds 2 or 3. Given the new draft bonus pools and the harsh penalties for exceeding them by 5% or more, the Cubs would be able to add two strong prospects instead of just one.
I admit that this approach can work beautifully, but it requires a convergence of factors in order to pull it off. Specifically, the team has to be staring down two or more players of similar or equal value with at least one of them willing to go underslot. This worked out perfectly for the Astros in 2012 when they chose role 7 SS Carlos Correa and $2.4M savings over role 7 SP Mark Appel. They used the extra funds to sign a pair of prospects away from strong college commitments in compensation round draftee Lance McCullers ($2.5M bonus v. $1.26M slot) and fourth rounder Rio Ruiz ($1.85M bonus v. $360,200 slot).
McCullers is progressing up the prospect ladder, although he is hardly dominating the competition and may very well find himself in the bullpen. Ruiz is producing moderately well at A+, but the third baseman may find himself heading across the diamond to first base where his bat may not play.
Regardless, the results of McCullers and Ruiz are not the point. The point is this: it requires an incredible confluence of factors to justify going so wildly underslot at the top of the draft, and even if it makes sense, using the extra funds later on may or may not pay any dividends.
Here are the two reasons this just doesn't make sense for the Cubs in 2014:
Reason #1: Drafting at #4, the Cost Savings Just Aren't That Significant
When the Astros drafted top-five talent Correa, they saved $2.4M a whopping $2.4M. In order for the Cubs to save $2.4M on their top pick, they'd have to sign a player for $2.2M, substantially under their $4,621,200 slot. They could certainly seek to save less by drafting a better player, but obviously that means they would have less buying power for their subsequent picks.
In this year's draft, the drop off from #1 ($7,922,100) to #3 ($5,721,500) is $2.2M. Thus, if Brady Aiken believes that the Marlins will not draft him at #2 and he will thus drop to #3, he has a strong incentive to agree to an underslot deal with Houston that may even be $2M under slot.
Conversely, if the Cubs seek to find $2M of savings, they'd have to find a player who does not expect to be drafted until #14 ($2,613,200 slot) at the earliest. Otherwise, that player would be incentivized to wait and see if he is selected from picks 5-14.
There is plenty of value in going underslot at #1 in a draft with lots of great players but no clear-cut star; such value is exponentially lower at #4, especially in what I view as a four-player draft, which brings me to point #2...
Reason #2: There Is a Substantial Talent Dropoff After the Top Four Players in This Draft
To me, the top of this draft is relatively straightforward. Brady Aiken looks like an ace in a durable lefty package with top flight stuff. Carlos Rodon looks like a lesser version of Aiken, but still with a great fastball and an incredible slider/cutter. Tyler Kolek is 6'5", 245 lbs. and throws 102; if your minor league coaches can't work with that package, they should quit. And Alex Jackson is a masher, a potential .280+ hitter with 20+ homers with the ability and body for even more. If he's truly a catcher, Jackson is a 1.1 candidate; if he's a corner outfielder, he's still a top-four player.
Now how hard was that?
Some folks are making noise about Nick Gordon, Aaron Nola, and even Max Pentecost. Just stop it. Those four names listed above are the four that look like potential role 7 players while everyone else is in the 5-6 range. Those a good players, but the grade jumps are there for a reason and the jump from 6 to 7 is rarely made. Gordon has no very limited power projection and I'm not a big fan of his swing; he looks like Billy Hamilton with a bit less speed, a better stroke overall, and shortstop defense. That's a good player to be sure, but no power and a decent swing at #4? I don't see how Nola is going to work as a pro with that arm slot. And Pentecost is a Wely Castillo type, a nice player who can play an every day role on a contender but who must do so from the 7th or 8th spot in the lineup. Again, at #4? Really?
Going underslot makes sense when there's a similar or equal player to be had for less money. Of course you should maximize your value in that instance. But the beauty of picking at the top of the draft is that you should get a star-level prospect. Don't punt on the star-level piece just to get two good-level prospects. It's not worth it. Plus, if the front office really trusts the scouting and development process, the scouts should be able to find another excellent pick in the second and third rounds with the minor league staff developing that talent too.
When it comes to punting on the chance to grab a top-tier prospect in favor of spreading the risk, just say no.
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