Somebody good.
That's the hope anyway, as it always is.
The new front office's shift in organizational focus from the MLB Cubs to the ranks of the minor leagues coincided well with my growing interest in prospecting a few years back. As such, I find that the kids of the system tend to be far more compelling studies than the fodder making up most of the big club.
This means that I have spent many nights trying to figure out exactly what piece should be added to the organizational puzzle with the team's top pick this June. Here are many of those thoughts.
Best Player Available v. Need
A general issue that must be addressed: should the team draft the best player available ("BPA") or draft for need? This is always an interesting hypothetical debate, but it seems especially pertinent here. The emerging consensus is that the top of the 2014 draft is arm-heavy while the Cubs system is arm-weak. This appears to be a match made in heaven.
But in baseball, even more so than in basketball, football, or hockey, the team should draft the BPA. Drafting based on need is generally a good way to limit the value of the pick. In football, there are situations in which this may make sense. Consider a team with a glaring need at safety but a stout defensive tackle rotation drafting with the top two players on their board a safety and a defensive tackle. In that limited situation, the safety makes sense, particularly if the team can plug said safety into the lineup from Day One and field a contender.
Of course, baseball doesn't work that way with draftees spending somewhere in the range of 2-5 years in the minor leagues before reaching The Show. It's BPA or bust...
Then again, as with all rules, there is an exception to the above: when the BPA has an extremely specific, limited skill set. In the case of the Cubs, I would advise against them drafting a bat-only first baseman what with Anthony Rizzo and Dan Vogelbach both controllable through 2021. With Rizzo, Bryant, and Vogelbach all projecting as playable first basemen and the limited defensive value and defensive home of bat-only, first base-only prospects, I wouldn't draft a first baseman at the top of the draft. Once you reach the third or fourth round of the MLB draft, basically every rule goes out the window and teams should be drafting the BPA even if the result is positional stacking.
The Draft Prospects
With that out of the way, here's my preference, in order, for the Cubs at #4. Only four prospects make this list, though I'll briefly address my issues with those not making the cut at the end.
1. LHP Brady Aiken
School: Cathedral Catholic HS, Cardiff by the Sea, CA
Date of Birth: 8/16/96 (draft day age: 17 years, 9 months)
Height, Weight: 6'4", 205 lbs.
Bat/Throw: L/L
Analysis: Of all the prospects I have seen on video and read about over the past four years, Aiken is my favorite. The California lefty features a mid-70s 12-6 curveball that profiles as a 60 pitch. He also throws a low-80s changeup that already has the look of an average offering and should be in the 65 range at maturity. The secondary stuff alone is enough to get him drafted in the first round.
But three factors get him to my top spot: age, mechanics and the fastball. I'll address them in reverse order. The fastball is a beast. He was consistently throwing it in the high-80s and low-90s until the beginning of the 2014 prep season when he unleashed 92-95 consistently while repeatedly hitting 97. Even if the pitch had no movement, it would be a 70 grade pitch. Given it's slight tail, I'm comfortable slapping a future 80 on it as his command develops. It is a monstrous pitch from a lefty.
Aiken's delivery is extremely smooth. He has a fluid windup with little-to-no unnecessary movement. His delivery is closer to 3/4 than a true over-the-top motion, but the fluidity of the complete motion suggests that he stands a good chance of maintaining his health as he progresses. Excellent physical conditioning has certainly helped him keep his delivery clean, something that should also help him move rather quickly through an MLB system even as a high school draftee.
His timeline brings us to the final factor. Aiken will be 17 years, 9 months old on draft day. The good folks at Fangraphs ran a piece a few years ago detailing the impact of prospect age, unsurprisingly finding that 17-year-olds who projected at a high level produced better than their 18-year-old competitors from the same drat class given that they were a full year less developed yet already possessed similar talent.
Aiken already has possibly the best stuff in this draft class, he has clean mechanics, a clean bill of health, excellent physical conditioning, and he is among the youngest players eligible for selection. If he is on the board at #4, I sure hope that the Cubs snatch him up, adding a potential 80 grade starter to the organization who looks like a 60 grade starter even if it doesn't quite come together for him as planned.
2. LHP Carlos Rodon
School: NC State
Date of Birth: 12/10/92 (draft day age: 21 years, 5 months)
Height, Weight: 6'3", 234 lbs.
Bat/Throw: L/L
Analysis: Long-presumed to be the top pick in the draft class, Rodon saw his perch waiver a bit during the early portion of the college season. More recently, his velocity returned and he showed the ability to dominate hitters that scouts had been looking to see.
Rodon's bread and butter is a low-to-mid-90s four-seam fastball that generates a bit of tail thanks to some whip in his delivery. He complements the four seamer with a two-seam heater in the low-90s with more dive and tail. Presumably the fastballs may be used in conjunction with each other to generate weak contact. Especially from a lefty, we're looking at a 70 grade fastball given his ability to change speeds and movement.
Rodon's go-to offspeed pitch is a slider/cutter hybrid that works in the high-80s, though he can add a bit of velocity or subtract a bit to get more movement. The pitch doesn't generate the two-plane movement of most great sliders, but the velocity and horizontal movement should still give him a 65 grade pitch.
His slower offspeed pitches require more projection. He does throw a mid-70s curveball and a low-80s changeup, but neither pitch projects as a plus offering, nor has either pitch functioned as a major part of his arsenal.
Rodon is generally regarded as having average command, although he could use to improve in that area. Of greater concern to met are his mechanics. Unlike Aiken, Rodon has some jerkiness to his delivery. It appears though he loses some of his lower half prior to release, causing excess stress on his shoulder to generate velocity. His windup and delivery is certainly not as fluid as Aiken's.
Nonetheless, Rodon features an elite fastball and a possibly elite slider/cutter with the ability to alter those pitches in a way that suggests advanced pitchability. Although he currently lacks an MLB-caliber third pitch, it's not hard to imagine him refining his changeup, fixing his curveball, or even learning a splitter. With a third offering in hand, Rodon could be among the top five lefty starters in baseball within a couple of years with a 65 grade profile. That's certainly worth a top-four pick, even with the mechanical concerns.
3. RHP Tyler Kolek
School: Shepherd High School, Shepherd, Texas
Date of Birth: 12/15/95 (draft day age: 18 years, 5 months)
Height, Weight: 6'5", 250 lbs.
Bat/Throw: R/R
Analysis: Power, power, and more power. Kolek's fastball velocity is a pure 80 as he works in the mid-90s and has repeatedly hit triple digits with the offering. Unfortunately, the pitch lacks movement and Kolek has a long way to go in truly commanding the offering. Even if the command lingers behind the velocity at maturity, it's still a 70 or 75 grade pitch.
It gets a lot messier after that. His most promising secondary offering is a low-80s slider that has sharp, two-plane break to it, though command is still an issue. His mid-70s curveball and low-80s slider lag significantly behind the slider, let alone the fastball.
From what I have seen, command is currently a weak spot. Kolek gets good marks for his effort and this could be a coachable area for him as a professional. Similarly, while his massive athletic frame garnered interest from Texas A&M as a defensive lineman, Kolek likely needs to lose a bit of weight as he matures. This shouldn't be a major concern and converting some baby fat to muscle will leave him with an ideal workhorse physique.
His delivery is fluid and he uses his large body well to generate velocity without appearing to put excess stress on his arm. The arm will take a beating at that velocity level regardless of mechanics, but the body and delivery should keep him healthy.
Selecting Kolek would represent a serious vote of confidence in the minor league coaching staffs. He's got a long ways to go in refining his arsenal, unlike Aiken, but if he reaches his potential he's an 80 grade ace. The stuff is good enough that he should make the majors regardless, but if his command falters, he may end up as a back-of-the-rotation starter or even at the back of the bullpen.
4. OF/C Alex Jackson
School: Rancho Bernardo High School, Escondido, CA
Date of Birth: 12/25/95 (draft day age: 18 years, 5 months)
Height, Weight: 6'2", 210 lbs.
Bat/Throw: R/R
Analysis: To me, Jackson is the one bat worthy of selection at #4. Alarmingly, he is even more "boom or bust" than Javier Baez was in 2011.
Jackson is all about the bat. He has a big, athletic physique that can likely hold plenty of additional muscle, although he is already plenty developed currently. He has a swing with a lot of moving parts, featuring a sizable load and leg kick, and I suspect that this will be easily quieted as he develops.
He is athletic enough and has a pretty enough swing to generate significant power. He projects offensively in a manner very similar to Kris Bryant as a 50-55 hitter with 70-75 grade power. Bryant's discipline and patience figure to allow the power to play in spite of only an average hit tool; I can't speak to Jackson's discipline but that's part of the nature of drafting a high school bat. The risk is higher.
The big wild card with Jackson is his defensive home. He will certainly be athletic enough to man a corner outfield spot. He doesn't project to be better than a 40 grade runner, but his big arm and generally athleticism should render him playable in the outfield. However, Jackson is currently a catcher and I suspect that whatever team drafts him will give him every opportunity to stick behind the dish. If he can be even a below average but playable defender, his bat would enable Jackson to be among the most valuable players in the game. His physique may not allow for it. But if it does, he could be a monster in the Buster Posey mold with less on base ability but more power.
The Not-Quite-Good-Enough Prospects
According to Patrick Mooney on CSN Chicago, the Cubs are considering eight prospects in addition to the four listed above. Here are the prospects and why I think the Cubs should pass:
RHP Tyler Beede, Vanderbilt: Despite Beede's connection to Cubs Minor League Pitching Coordinator Derek Johnson, Beede doesn't have the upside to warrant such a high selection. He profiles as a #4 starter to me with decent but unspectacular stuff and some command issues.
RHP Jeff Hoffman, East Carolina: The big, powerful righty could develop the arsenal to pitch atop a strong rotation, but he looks a bit out of control in his delivery for my taste. I'm concerned about his ability to command any of his arsenal, not just the secondary stuff. He'd present good value in the middle of the first round but not in the top five.
SS Jacob Gatewood, CA High School: Gatewood is similar to Jackson in that he is a big, strong, and athletic high school power hitter. But where Jackson's swing is smooth, Gatewood's is choppy and awkward with an extreme uppercut. If he needs that uppercut to generate power, he's never going to hit much.
SS Trea Turner, NC State: Easily my least favorite of the supposed contenders for a top-ten selection, Turner simply can't hit. He's never going to hit for any power. It's hard to justify a top-five pick on a player who will never have the ability to hit for power, and even with good speed and defense, I'd be despondent if we chose him.
C/1B Kyle Schwarber, Indiana: Schwarber is a beefy prospect with a good looking swing and an advanced approach. His bat should carry him to the majors and the possibility of him sticking at catcher in enticing. However, to me, he isn't much of an athlete, all but ruling out staying at catcher. The value of a bat-only first baseman better be off the charts to justify a top-five pick and Schwarber looks like a good, not great, prospect.
RHP Aaron Nola, LSU: It's all about the release point for me with Nola. His very low release point leads to a relatively flat fastball. Flat fastballs don't work at the highest level; the pitcher either needs downward trajectory from a high release point or downward movement from spin. Nola has neither. Drafting a pitcher at #4 with a middling fastball? No thanks.
SS Nick Gordon, FL High School: Much like his older brother Dee, Nick is a beanpole. He certainly projects to have more power than Dee as he fills out a bit more, but his game is currently too sloppy for me to see a star. Some team will draft him highly based on his overall ceiling given contributions in multiple facets of the game.
OF Michael Conforto, Oregon State: Conforto has no defensive value as a below-average left fielder or possible first baseman at the highest level. His bat is pretty with a compact lefty power stroke and excellent discipline at the plate. Still, his defensive, running, and athletic shortcomings make a top-five pick a reach.
LHP Brandon Finnegan, TCU: A diminutive (5'11") lefty, Finnegan nonetheless generates big velocity, working in the 90s with the ability to ratchet things up to the high-90s. His command is solid, but the secondary pitches, while projectable, lag behind at this point with his breaker a bit too slurvy and his changeup a bit too straight.
Conclusion
I am, rather obviously, less enthused with Alex Jackson than I am with the three pitchers that proceed him. But I think his power bat warrants top-five selection.
I really like Tyler Kolek. While acknowledging that his command appears lacking at this point, the fireballing teenager is too reminiscent of Kerry Wood to ignore. Plus, he's got the body to stick in a rotation even if the command never perfects.
Carlos Rodon would be a gift at #4, although his NC State coaches allowing him to throw 134 pitches in a recent start suggests that the box may have a few dents and dings in it. Regardless, he would immediately be among the best pitching prospects in the game upon selection and would figure into the Cubs' plans as soon as 2016.
But I'd pass on all three of those guys and every other player in the draft for the chance to select Brady Aiken. He is the complete prospect package: physique, velocity, movement, repeatability, mechanical soundness, conditioning, and diversity of arsenal.
So that's it. In my perfect world, the Cubs get Brady Aiken at #4, he flies through the system, and makes David Price look like Shawn Estes. Of course, he could just as easily turn out like Mark Pawelek. Such is life in the draft.
Saturday, April 19, 2014
Thursday, April 3, 2014
Cecilio Aybar and Unintended Consequences in the World of International Amateur Free Agents
This entry will tell a story. Actually, it will tell three stories that weave together to tell one story that Major League Baseball would almost certainly prefer not to tell. I prefer to live in reality with all of its messes, so here we go.
The New International Signing Bonus Regime
Seen largely as a precursor to an international draft, MLB and the MLBPA agreed to institute a new system to curb spending on international amateur free agents in advance of the 2012-13 signing period. Teams spent a total of $47M in the 2011-12 signing period between July and December 2011, yet they appear to have spent significantly in the first six months of 2012 as well, a rarity in the past but an impact of the new system in place in July 2012. Spending in calendar year 2011 and 2012 was down $3M, suggesting that the new regime had its desired effect; the MLBPA preferred to see some of that cash deposited into the pockets of members as opposed to those of Dominican, Venezuelan, Taiwanese, and South Korean teenagers.
Overall, spending went from $73M in 2010 to $87M in 2011, down to $84M in 2012, then back up all the way to $97M in 2013. Such figures do not include the massive deals given to international free agents Yoenis Cespedes, Jorge Soler, and Yasiel Puig. Simply put, even with strict penalties in place that significantly limit maximum expenditures in future years for exceeding a team's bonus pool, teams just kept on spending.
The penalties themselves were designed to be so onerous that no team would reasonably exceed them. Each team is given a pool of bonus money to spend in inverse relation to their wins in the previous season. The pool is calculated by giving each team $700K and then the corresponding amount to each of their imaginary international draft pick slots. This method is important because those slots may be traded.
The most stringent penalty in the 2013-14 period is enforced against a team that spent more than 15% over its pool allotment. If spending exceed 115% of the bonus pool, the team pays a 100% tax on the overage and may not sign a player for more than a $250K bonus in the 2014-15 signing period. Effectively the penalty takes the team out of the running for any of the top 50 international prospects in the subsequent year. A team exceeding the bonus pool in the same fashion in the 2014-15 signing period instead of the 2013-14 signing period is met with an even harsher penalty: the same 100% tax on the overage and the inability to extend a bonus in excess of $250K in the next two signing periods.
Chicago Cubs Spending in the 2013-14 International Signing Period
Generally speaking, spending continued to climb at a gradual rate. After a few international bonus slots were traded, bonus pools ranged from the Cubs with $5,520,300 down to the Angels at just $1,389,700. Just two teams spent in excess of $4.5M, but they both blew past that number. The Rangers and the Cubs acknowledged and took advantage of the fact that spending 115.0000001% of your bonus pool was met with the same penalty as spending 150% of the bonus pool, although the attendant tax hit obviously increased as well. Both clubs spent over $8M on international amateur signing bonuses.
The Rangers have employed this strategy for years with their approach in the 2013-14 period suggesting only that they would largely continue along the same lines until the Collective Bargaining Agreement stopped them from doing so, which it will for the 2014-15 period as their penalty restricts them to maximum bonuses of $250K.
But for the Cubs, this represented a major shift. I examined what records I could find of the Cubs spending on international signing bonuses dating to 2007. For each year, I recorded every bonus of at least $100K and then assigned a gradually escalating estimate for bonuses below that $100K figure, starting with $1.5M in 2007 and climbing to $2.1M in 2013. By my calculations and estimates, the Cubs spent the following amount on truly amateur international free agents (thus, Jorge Soler and Gerardo Concepcion are excluded as veterans of Cuba's Serie Nacional):
2007: $2.72M
2008: $3.74M
2009: $4.725M
2010: $6.975M
2011: $7.02M
2012: $4.67M (this year would otherwise include $10.6M of bonus and salary for Soler and Concepcion)
2013: $13.8697M (excludes $1.6M salaries for Soler and Concepcion; includes $3.1247M in tax)
(It is possible that reporting of these signings improved over time, thus explaining some of the increase in spending. I think a philosophical shift in the organization is more likely.)
The Cubs didn't just spend: they spent on the premier talent available. The great folks at Minor League Ball, Baseball America, and MLB.com provided rankings of the top 30 (or more) prospects available in July 2013. The following shows the Cubs' haul with their respective rankings by the three sources above in parentheses:
$2.8M for OF Eloy Jimenez (1, 1, 1)
$1.7M for SS Gleyber Torres (2, 2, 3)
$1.625M for RHP Jen-Ho Tseng (12, 23, 29)
$850K for RHP Jefferson Mejia (20, unranked, unranked)
$650K for RHP Erling Moreno (48, 16, 17)
Unknown amount for 3B Wladimir Galindo (64, unranked, 25)
The Cubs also added C Johan Matos for $270K. While that bonus is not substantial for a July 2nd signee, it was an essential addition to an organization without any catching depth.
Still, two names on the above list stand out and they are those with "unranked" written after their names. First, Mejia was unranked by Baseball America and MLB.com because he had previously falsely reported his age and was forced to wait a year to sign by MLB. Regardless, 6'7", 220 lbs. righties who throw in the low-90s are wonderful assets whether they are 16, 17, or 18, so the Minor League Ball ranking is likely most indicative of his talent.
Second, Galindo did not sign until December 18th, an oddity for top amateur talent. It is possible that identity issues delayed his signing, although I have not been able to find anything suggesting such. Still, Galindo's signing shows that the July 2nd signing period lasts all year, until the next July 2nd period (technically, the signing period runs from July 2nd to the following June 15th).
Cecilio Aybar and Identity Fraud
As noted above, Gleyber Torres was the #2 player for Minor League Ball. But that's not entirely accurate. Minor League Ball initially released their rankings on April 28th. In the intervening months, Minor League Ball's #2 prospect, a Dominican shortstop "named" Obispo Aybar-Lara was suspended from signing for one year by MLB when it was revealed that the 16-year-old Aybar-Lara was actually 19-year-old Cecilio Aybar, Obispo's older brother. The Minor League Ball ranking addressed the concerns, noting that Aybar would still be in the 15-20 range and worthy of a seven-figure bonus even if he proved to be 19 instead of 16 with his speed, defense, and a quick bat providing value regardless of age; his true age almost certainly curbs any power projection as a 165 lbs. 16-year-old offers more physical projection than a 19-year-old of the same weight. Still, 6'0", 180 lbs. - a realistic physical projection - would be plenty of size to stick as a shortstop if the glove and speed are legitimate. The site did re-rank prior to the signing period opening, placing Aybar at #31.
As punishment for falsifying records, Aybar received a one-year ban from MLB leaving him eligible to sign as of April 26, 2014. In many ways, Aybar is merely another in the long line of age and identity fraud among Latin American teenagers who seek to add a zero to their bonus number.
So How Does It All Fit Together?
You can probably see where this is going. Because Aybar's one year ban leaves him eligible to sign in April 2014, he is eligible to sign a bonus that will count against the signing team's 2013-14 pool provided that he signs his contract prior to June 15th. By my count, the Cubs, Rangers, and Dodgers have clearly exceeded their pools by more than 15% while the excess of some other teams appears close to the limit based on some admittedly imperfect information.
Regardless, the twisted situation has presented itself: a top international prospect, one worthy of a high-six or low-seven-figure bonus, is about to find himself on the market with the three most aggressive spenders on the international market as his three most incentivized suitors as the Cubs, Rangers, and Dodgers will not incur any additional penalties for a signing of any amount (beyond the tax payment). To make matters worse for MLB (and better for the signing team assuming that it is one of these three), they get to use cash from the 2014 budget to make the signing, effectively allowing them to participate for major talent in the 2014-15 signing period in spite of the CBA's penalties.
Aybar's punishment for his identity fraud may very likely be a few months of shame and a six-figure bonus anyway from a desirable team. I suppose that there is a remote possibility that concerns about Aybar's ability to obtain a visa will quash his market, but this seems highly unlikely.
With all of that said, I hope that the Cubs pursue and sign Aybar. I tend not to think too highly of speed/defense middle infielders because I want everyone to hit for power, but a 70 speed shortstop with the chops to be an asset with his glove and a playable bat is a really valuable asset. If Aybar's projection doesn't match the bonus, they should probably avoid him. But if he really is a top-30 talent or thereabouts, the chance to acquire him for the Cubs is yet another golden opportunity to beef up the farm system even if MLB and MLBPA might just hate it.
The New International Signing Bonus Regime
Seen largely as a precursor to an international draft, MLB and the MLBPA agreed to institute a new system to curb spending on international amateur free agents in advance of the 2012-13 signing period. Teams spent a total of $47M in the 2011-12 signing period between July and December 2011, yet they appear to have spent significantly in the first six months of 2012 as well, a rarity in the past but an impact of the new system in place in July 2012. Spending in calendar year 2011 and 2012 was down $3M, suggesting that the new regime had its desired effect; the MLBPA preferred to see some of that cash deposited into the pockets of members as opposed to those of Dominican, Venezuelan, Taiwanese, and South Korean teenagers.
Overall, spending went from $73M in 2010 to $87M in 2011, down to $84M in 2012, then back up all the way to $97M in 2013. Such figures do not include the massive deals given to international free agents Yoenis Cespedes, Jorge Soler, and Yasiel Puig. Simply put, even with strict penalties in place that significantly limit maximum expenditures in future years for exceeding a team's bonus pool, teams just kept on spending.
The penalties themselves were designed to be so onerous that no team would reasonably exceed them. Each team is given a pool of bonus money to spend in inverse relation to their wins in the previous season. The pool is calculated by giving each team $700K and then the corresponding amount to each of their imaginary international draft pick slots. This method is important because those slots may be traded.
The most stringent penalty in the 2013-14 period is enforced against a team that spent more than 15% over its pool allotment. If spending exceed 115% of the bonus pool, the team pays a 100% tax on the overage and may not sign a player for more than a $250K bonus in the 2014-15 signing period. Effectively the penalty takes the team out of the running for any of the top 50 international prospects in the subsequent year. A team exceeding the bonus pool in the same fashion in the 2014-15 signing period instead of the 2013-14 signing period is met with an even harsher penalty: the same 100% tax on the overage and the inability to extend a bonus in excess of $250K in the next two signing periods.
Chicago Cubs Spending in the 2013-14 International Signing Period
Generally speaking, spending continued to climb at a gradual rate. After a few international bonus slots were traded, bonus pools ranged from the Cubs with $5,520,300 down to the Angels at just $1,389,700. Just two teams spent in excess of $4.5M, but they both blew past that number. The Rangers and the Cubs acknowledged and took advantage of the fact that spending 115.0000001% of your bonus pool was met with the same penalty as spending 150% of the bonus pool, although the attendant tax hit obviously increased as well. Both clubs spent over $8M on international amateur signing bonuses.
The Rangers have employed this strategy for years with their approach in the 2013-14 period suggesting only that they would largely continue along the same lines until the Collective Bargaining Agreement stopped them from doing so, which it will for the 2014-15 period as their penalty restricts them to maximum bonuses of $250K.
But for the Cubs, this represented a major shift. I examined what records I could find of the Cubs spending on international signing bonuses dating to 2007. For each year, I recorded every bonus of at least $100K and then assigned a gradually escalating estimate for bonuses below that $100K figure, starting with $1.5M in 2007 and climbing to $2.1M in 2013. By my calculations and estimates, the Cubs spent the following amount on truly amateur international free agents (thus, Jorge Soler and Gerardo Concepcion are excluded as veterans of Cuba's Serie Nacional):
2007: $2.72M
2008: $3.74M
2009: $4.725M
2010: $6.975M
2011: $7.02M
2012: $4.67M (this year would otherwise include $10.6M of bonus and salary for Soler and Concepcion)
2013: $13.8697M (excludes $1.6M salaries for Soler and Concepcion; includes $3.1247M in tax)
(It is possible that reporting of these signings improved over time, thus explaining some of the increase in spending. I think a philosophical shift in the organization is more likely.)
The Cubs didn't just spend: they spent on the premier talent available. The great folks at Minor League Ball, Baseball America, and MLB.com provided rankings of the top 30 (or more) prospects available in July 2013. The following shows the Cubs' haul with their respective rankings by the three sources above in parentheses:
$2.8M for OF Eloy Jimenez (1, 1, 1)
$1.7M for SS Gleyber Torres (2, 2, 3)
$1.625M for RHP Jen-Ho Tseng (12, 23, 29)
$850K for RHP Jefferson Mejia (20, unranked, unranked)
$650K for RHP Erling Moreno (48, 16, 17)
Unknown amount for 3B Wladimir Galindo (64, unranked, 25)
The Cubs also added C Johan Matos for $270K. While that bonus is not substantial for a July 2nd signee, it was an essential addition to an organization without any catching depth.
Still, two names on the above list stand out and they are those with "unranked" written after their names. First, Mejia was unranked by Baseball America and MLB.com because he had previously falsely reported his age and was forced to wait a year to sign by MLB. Regardless, 6'7", 220 lbs. righties who throw in the low-90s are wonderful assets whether they are 16, 17, or 18, so the Minor League Ball ranking is likely most indicative of his talent.
Second, Galindo did not sign until December 18th, an oddity for top amateur talent. It is possible that identity issues delayed his signing, although I have not been able to find anything suggesting such. Still, Galindo's signing shows that the July 2nd signing period lasts all year, until the next July 2nd period (technically, the signing period runs from July 2nd to the following June 15th).
Cecilio Aybar and Identity Fraud
As noted above, Gleyber Torres was the #2 player for Minor League Ball. But that's not entirely accurate. Minor League Ball initially released their rankings on April 28th. In the intervening months, Minor League Ball's #2 prospect, a Dominican shortstop "named" Obispo Aybar-Lara was suspended from signing for one year by MLB when it was revealed that the 16-year-old Aybar-Lara was actually 19-year-old Cecilio Aybar, Obispo's older brother. The Minor League Ball ranking addressed the concerns, noting that Aybar would still be in the 15-20 range and worthy of a seven-figure bonus even if he proved to be 19 instead of 16 with his speed, defense, and a quick bat providing value regardless of age; his true age almost certainly curbs any power projection as a 165 lbs. 16-year-old offers more physical projection than a 19-year-old of the same weight. Still, 6'0", 180 lbs. - a realistic physical projection - would be plenty of size to stick as a shortstop if the glove and speed are legitimate. The site did re-rank prior to the signing period opening, placing Aybar at #31.
As punishment for falsifying records, Aybar received a one-year ban from MLB leaving him eligible to sign as of April 26, 2014. In many ways, Aybar is merely another in the long line of age and identity fraud among Latin American teenagers who seek to add a zero to their bonus number.
So How Does It All Fit Together?
You can probably see where this is going. Because Aybar's one year ban leaves him eligible to sign in April 2014, he is eligible to sign a bonus that will count against the signing team's 2013-14 pool provided that he signs his contract prior to June 15th. By my count, the Cubs, Rangers, and Dodgers have clearly exceeded their pools by more than 15% while the excess of some other teams appears close to the limit based on some admittedly imperfect information.
Regardless, the twisted situation has presented itself: a top international prospect, one worthy of a high-six or low-seven-figure bonus, is about to find himself on the market with the three most aggressive spenders on the international market as his three most incentivized suitors as the Cubs, Rangers, and Dodgers will not incur any additional penalties for a signing of any amount (beyond the tax payment). To make matters worse for MLB (and better for the signing team assuming that it is one of these three), they get to use cash from the 2014 budget to make the signing, effectively allowing them to participate for major talent in the 2014-15 signing period in spite of the CBA's penalties.
Aybar's punishment for his identity fraud may very likely be a few months of shame and a six-figure bonus anyway from a desirable team. I suppose that there is a remote possibility that concerns about Aybar's ability to obtain a visa will quash his market, but this seems highly unlikely.
With all of that said, I hope that the Cubs pursue and sign Aybar. I tend not to think too highly of speed/defense middle infielders because I want everyone to hit for power, but a 70 speed shortstop with the chops to be an asset with his glove and a playable bat is a really valuable asset. If Aybar's projection doesn't match the bonus, they should probably avoid him. But if he really is a top-30 talent or thereabouts, the chance to acquire him for the Cubs is yet another golden opportunity to beef up the farm system even if MLB and MLBPA might just hate it.
Friday, March 21, 2014
2014 MLB Predictions
My two-year-old daughter Lilly has a new love in this world: baseball song. Many times each day, she asks her mom "Daddy, baseball game?" to find out when we can go to our first game of the year. She knows that Daddy cheated and went to the Phoenix area for a weekend of baseball with her Baba, Grandma, and Uncle Mike, but that hasn't tempered her enthusiasm. She finishes my lines on "Go Cubs Go," "Take Me Out to the Ballgame," and "Hey Hey Holy Mackerel;" she regularly asks for "Mackerel" by name and it's basically the sweetest thing in the world.
She has only ever known truly dreadful Cubs teams in her short life. Thankfully, there's reason for hope around the corner, and she is regularly told of the brighter days in 2015 and beyond.
Unfortunately, 2014 has to happen first. With that in mind, here's a look at what I foresee happening this year with full appreciation for the fact that these predictions will be senseless by next week (just think about those poor souls who thought Oakland or Atlanta's pitching would carry them to the promised land a few weeks ago).
AL West
1. Texas Rangers (88-74). There's enough talent here for them to hang on for one more year, but the pitching behind Yu Darvish does look shaky to me.
2. Anaheim Angels (84-78). Trout, Pujols, and Hamilton. They've got to score at some point, right? I think the offense explodes as Pujols has at least one more big year in him, but the pitching keeps them from the postseason picture.
3. Seattle Mariners (79-83). The Cano signing pushes them to respectability, but they needed Taijuan Walker to grab a job from the get-go to make noise in 2014. There are lots of bats without speed or defense. Still, I'm one of the few who genuinely likes the Cano contract for Seattle while acknowledging the dead weight on the back end.
4. Oakland Athletics (77-85). The pitching injuries already hit, and every now and then even Billy Beane can't pull a rabbit out of a hat.
5. Houston Astros (63-99). They are still dreadful, but the arrival of George Springer, Jon Singleton, Dexter Fowler, and even Scott Feldman should make the club solidly better than in 2013. The pitching is still really awful.
AL Central
1. Detroit Tigers (89-73). The Tigers are lucky that their division is so weak. With an aging core and no depth on offense or in the rotation, a strong debut from Nick Castellanos is the only thing that props them up for one more year. That and the fact that there rest of the division just isn't good.
2. Cleveland Indians (87-75). I like Cleveland quite a bit. They have a pair of centerpiece bats in Jason Kipnis and Carlos Santana - hopefully third base doesn't affect Santana at the plate - to go along with a deep rotation with a contract year near-ace (Justin Masterson) and a rising star (Danny Salazar). If Lonnie Chisenhall gives them anything, they could unseat Detroit.
3.Kansas City Royals (83-79). The Royals may be baseball's most interesting team to watch this year. The lineup includes Eric Hosmer's attempt to breakout, solid veterans in Billy Butler and Alex Gordon, and massive breakout candidates/wild cards in Mike Moustakas and Lorenzo Cain. Much like Cleveland, the rotation has a contract year ace (James Shields) and young fireballer Yordano Ventura who looks like a real pitcher with an electric arm. The other rotation arms - Jason Vargas, Jeremy Guthrie, and Bruce Chen - keep the Royals afloat but also keep them from taking the next step. If Kyle Zimmer can force his way to Kansas City after the All-Star Break, they could have a run in them.
4. Chicago White Sox (72-90). The White Sox at least have some interesting pieces with Jose Abreu, Adam Eaton, Matt Davidson, and Erik Johnson all showing up to complement Chris Sale. There's still not nearly enough talent to contend however. At least this is Adam Dunn's swan song.
5. Minnesota Twins (70-92). While signing Ricky Nolasco and Phil Hughes should help this year, the rest of the team is very poor with replacement-level talent occupying a plethora of starting spots.
AL East
1. Tampa Bay Rays (93-69). They're going to have 162 games started by good, competent MLB starting pitchers with David Price, Matt Moore, Alex Cobb, Chris Archer, Erik Bedard, Jake Odorizzi, Nate Karns, and Jeremy Hellickson all on board. Wow. The offense isn't deep, but a 2-3-4 of Ben Zobrist, Evan Longoria, and Wil Myers will score enough.
2. Boston Red Sox (91-71). I have never understood the Jackie Bradley Jr. hype, but it doesn't matter with Grady Sizemore apparently "back," at least until he's gone again. The lineup has a deep core, and there is enough pitching for a good start every time out. It's hard to pick against that bullpen.
3. New York Yankees (88-74). They made a lot of loud moves this winter, but there are still too many holes to overtake Tampa Bay and Boston. I think that they're just better than a .500 team that will pull off another big move or two in a push for October that barely proves successful. Fox is salivating at the possibility of a Yankees-Red Sox playoff game.
4. Toronto Blue Jays (75-87). The roster plays to its potential. Unfortunately, they're stuck in the AL East, so it doesn't mean much as they're only on track for something like 82 wins at the All-Star break. They could win about eight more games if they keep the team together, but GM Alex Anthopolous is fired and the new regime decides to blow it up and start over, leading to lots of late season losses.
5. Baltimore Orioles (75-87). I genuinely like what the Orioles did this offseason, but there still just isn't enough pitching. If Chris Davis returns to earth, it's going to be the first ho-hum summer in Baltimore in a few years. It's about time for the Matt Wieters trade rumors to heat up, and he is going to command a pretty penny if they decide to move him.
NL West
1. Los Angeles Dodgers (99-63). Anything less than 95 wins should be seen as a massive disappointment. Money can't buy happiness, but it can buy a sterling pitching rotation with depth. The cost of such a rotation is mind-numbing: Clayton Kershaw ($22M - he's at $30M+ for the following six years), Zack Greinke ($24M), Hyun-Jin Ryu ($3.5M), Dan Haren ($10M), Paul Maholm ($6.5M assuming he meets likely incentives), Josh Beckett ($15.75M), and Chad Billingsley ($12M) combine to cost $93.75M in 2014, making their top seven starters the 17th highest team payroll in MLB. The offense has oodles of star power with the likes of Matt Kemp on the outside looking in.
2. San Francisco Giants (88-74). There's not much pitching depth beyond the top five, but the lineup is as strong as it has been in years with Pablo Sandoval's contract year propelling the unit.
3. Arizona Diamondbacks (85-77). The loss of Patrick Corbin is the loss of a playoff spot. The very strong Arizona lineup is complemented well by a very solid, league-average pitching staff that just needs another big arm. Archie Bradley could be that arm, as could Jeff Samardzija. If the Cubs deal Samardzija in 2014, Arizona still makes more sense than anyone else as the Snakes stand so much to gain from such an acquisition.
4. Colorado Rockies (78-84). One way to be an average team is with a strong offense and weak pitching. That has been Colorado's preferred method for basically their entire existence and it will rear its head again in 2014.
5. San Diego Padres (77-85). Average pitching and a below-average lineup does not a contender make.
NL Central
1. St. Louis Cardinals (97-65). Duh. Even though I'm not much of a Peter Bourjos fan, the lineup is incredibly deep with above-average players at every spot. But it's always about the pitching with St. Louis, and 2014 will be yet another confirmation that piles of pitching always win in baseball. Gross.
2. Cincinnati Reds (85-77). The health red flags were everywhere with this team even before Aroldis Chapman's horrific injury. Although the pitching looks good and the offense has some really big bats, I just have a feeling that this is the year Cincinnati struggles.
3. Milwaukee Brewers (82-80). The Brewers are going to surprise a lot of folks with some really good baseball in 2014. Few offenses can match the quartet of Ryan Braun, Carlos Gomez, Jonathan Lucroy, and Jean Segura given their across-the-board contributions. First base has been a massive hole since Prince Fielder left (pun intended), and it will keep them from October.
4. Pittsburgh Pirates (81-81). At least it's another year without being under .500. Gregory Polanco can't get there fast enough as Andrew McCutchen needs another star to help carry the load. The pitching looks good and the lineup looks good too, but outside of McCutchen, there's no greatness to bump them back among the contenders.
5. Chicago Cubs (58-104). It's all part of the plan. Starlin Castro will quiet at least some of his critics with his offensive showing and Javier Baez will inject some much-needed excitement into the fan base in the second half. But the offense is horrendous and the pitching is below-average. When the annual sell off ships out the likes of Nate Schierholtz, Luis Valbuena, Jason Hammel, Carlos Villanueva, and, most importantly, Jeff Samardzija, the club will seriously resemble the above-average AAA squad that they are. By 2016, fans will have a very hard time remembering the 2014 Opening Day lineup.
NL East
1. Washington Nationals (91-71). Anyone else winning this division will be a massive upset. The pitching is strong up top and throughout while the lineup doesn't have a poor bat to be found. It's a strong roster.
2. Atlanta Braves (87-75). Even at 87 wins, this number is a "what could have been?" tally as Kris Medlen and Brandon Beachy will both be sorely missed. The Atlanta offense has a chance to be special, but that requires the reemergence of Dan Uggla and/or B.J. Upton. I wouldn't bet on it.
3. New York Mets (75-87). I think Curtis Granderson will have a good year and David Wright will love having him around. It's a good thing too because little else excites me about this team.
4. Philadelphia Phillies (71-91). The Phillies take a lot of heat in the blogosphere, and they are most likely the worst team in baseball that is actively trying to win. Still, with Cliff Lee, Cole Hamels, and A.J. Burnett, a strong season is possible if....never mind. It's still an offense of Chase Utley - assuming his knees are alright - and nothing else exciting.
5. Miami Marlins (62-100). The Miami offense outside of Giancarlo Stanton is truly dreadful. But the pitching is a different story with a true ace in Jose Fernandez, a young top-of-the-rotation arm in Henderson Alvarez, a solid mid-rotation guy in Nate Eovaldi, a few back-end options in Jacob Turner, Brad Hand, and Tom Koehler all in front of a barrage of pitching prospects headlined by Andrew Heaney. They'll pitch too well to be the league's worst team, even if the offense will be a punishment to the eyes.
Playoffs
Compared to the 2013 postseason, this would see the Yankees and Rangers enter the AL picture at the expense of the Athletics and Indians. In the NL, the Nationals and Giants would kick out the Pirates and Reds. Based on the above records, the playoff tree is as follows:
AL Wild Card: New York Yankees @ Boston. I'll take the Sawks.
NL Wild Card: Atlanta @ San Francisco. Again, I'll go with the home team.
AL Divisional: Boston @ Tampa Bay. I like the Rays in a season, but I'll take Boston in a short series.
Texas @ Detroit. Tigers in a sweep.
NL Divisional: San Francisco @ Los Angeles. The Giants win in the playoffs and there's so much pressure on the Dodgers. Too much.
Washington @ St. Louis. I'll be contrarian and take the Nats.
AL Championship: Boston @ Detroit. The Tigers may be nearing the end, but they'll make the Fall Classic anyway.
NL Championship: San Francisco @ Washington. Nats Nats Nats.
World Series: Detroit v. Washington (home field determined by silly exhibition). The Nats just have the right stuff.
Awards
AL MVP: Mike Trout. Obviously. No projection necessary.
NL MVP: Bryce Harper. It's time and if the Nats are excellent, it'll be due to Harper's excellence. Something like a .290/.385/.540 line with 30+ homers and 15+ steals should do it.
AL Cy Young: David Price. He's healthy and this maybe a contract year with a trade at some point in the next 12 months followed by an extension.
NL Cy Young: Clayton Kershaw. The best of his generation.
AL Rookie of the Year: Masahiro Tanaka. I don't like that Tanaka will be eligible for the award as a professional veteran, but he'll win it anyway.
NL Rookie of the Year: Kolten Wong. He'll narrowly beat out Arizona shortstop Chris Owings thanks to hitting in an excellent lineup and playing the full season.
Draft Order
Based on these results, the top ten draft picks in 2015 will be:
1. Chicago Cubs (58-104)
2. Miami Marlins (62-100)
3. Houston Astros (63-99)
4. Minnesota Twins (70-92)
5. Philadelphia Phillies (71-91)
6. Chicago White Sox (72-90)
7. New York Mets (75-87)
8. Toronto Blue Jays (75-87)
9. Baltimore Orioles (75-87)
10. San Diego Padres (77-85)
Compared to the 2014 draft, only Seattle and Colorado would drop out of the top ten picks with the Padres and Orioles jumping in to take their places.
She has only ever known truly dreadful Cubs teams in her short life. Thankfully, there's reason for hope around the corner, and she is regularly told of the brighter days in 2015 and beyond.
Unfortunately, 2014 has to happen first. With that in mind, here's a look at what I foresee happening this year with full appreciation for the fact that these predictions will be senseless by next week (just think about those poor souls who thought Oakland or Atlanta's pitching would carry them to the promised land a few weeks ago).
AL West
1. Texas Rangers (88-74). There's enough talent here for them to hang on for one more year, but the pitching behind Yu Darvish does look shaky to me.
2. Anaheim Angels (84-78). Trout, Pujols, and Hamilton. They've got to score at some point, right? I think the offense explodes as Pujols has at least one more big year in him, but the pitching keeps them from the postseason picture.
3. Seattle Mariners (79-83). The Cano signing pushes them to respectability, but they needed Taijuan Walker to grab a job from the get-go to make noise in 2014. There are lots of bats without speed or defense. Still, I'm one of the few who genuinely likes the Cano contract for Seattle while acknowledging the dead weight on the back end.
4. Oakland Athletics (77-85). The pitching injuries already hit, and every now and then even Billy Beane can't pull a rabbit out of a hat.
5. Houston Astros (63-99). They are still dreadful, but the arrival of George Springer, Jon Singleton, Dexter Fowler, and even Scott Feldman should make the club solidly better than in 2013. The pitching is still really awful.
AL Central
1. Detroit Tigers (89-73). The Tigers are lucky that their division is so weak. With an aging core and no depth on offense or in the rotation, a strong debut from Nick Castellanos is the only thing that props them up for one more year. That and the fact that there rest of the division just isn't good.
2. Cleveland Indians (87-75). I like Cleveland quite a bit. They have a pair of centerpiece bats in Jason Kipnis and Carlos Santana - hopefully third base doesn't affect Santana at the plate - to go along with a deep rotation with a contract year near-ace (Justin Masterson) and a rising star (Danny Salazar). If Lonnie Chisenhall gives them anything, they could unseat Detroit.
3.Kansas City Royals (83-79). The Royals may be baseball's most interesting team to watch this year. The lineup includes Eric Hosmer's attempt to breakout, solid veterans in Billy Butler and Alex Gordon, and massive breakout candidates/wild cards in Mike Moustakas and Lorenzo Cain. Much like Cleveland, the rotation has a contract year ace (James Shields) and young fireballer Yordano Ventura who looks like a real pitcher with an electric arm. The other rotation arms - Jason Vargas, Jeremy Guthrie, and Bruce Chen - keep the Royals afloat but also keep them from taking the next step. If Kyle Zimmer can force his way to Kansas City after the All-Star Break, they could have a run in them.
4. Chicago White Sox (72-90). The White Sox at least have some interesting pieces with Jose Abreu, Adam Eaton, Matt Davidson, and Erik Johnson all showing up to complement Chris Sale. There's still not nearly enough talent to contend however. At least this is Adam Dunn's swan song.
5. Minnesota Twins (70-92). While signing Ricky Nolasco and Phil Hughes should help this year, the rest of the team is very poor with replacement-level talent occupying a plethora of starting spots.
AL East
1. Tampa Bay Rays (93-69). They're going to have 162 games started by good, competent MLB starting pitchers with David Price, Matt Moore, Alex Cobb, Chris Archer, Erik Bedard, Jake Odorizzi, Nate Karns, and Jeremy Hellickson all on board. Wow. The offense isn't deep, but a 2-3-4 of Ben Zobrist, Evan Longoria, and Wil Myers will score enough.
2. Boston Red Sox (91-71). I have never understood the Jackie Bradley Jr. hype, but it doesn't matter with Grady Sizemore apparently "back," at least until he's gone again. The lineup has a deep core, and there is enough pitching for a good start every time out. It's hard to pick against that bullpen.
3. New York Yankees (88-74). They made a lot of loud moves this winter, but there are still too many holes to overtake Tampa Bay and Boston. I think that they're just better than a .500 team that will pull off another big move or two in a push for October that barely proves successful. Fox is salivating at the possibility of a Yankees-Red Sox playoff game.
4. Toronto Blue Jays (75-87). The roster plays to its potential. Unfortunately, they're stuck in the AL East, so it doesn't mean much as they're only on track for something like 82 wins at the All-Star break. They could win about eight more games if they keep the team together, but GM Alex Anthopolous is fired and the new regime decides to blow it up and start over, leading to lots of late season losses.
5. Baltimore Orioles (75-87). I genuinely like what the Orioles did this offseason, but there still just isn't enough pitching. If Chris Davis returns to earth, it's going to be the first ho-hum summer in Baltimore in a few years. It's about time for the Matt Wieters trade rumors to heat up, and he is going to command a pretty penny if they decide to move him.
NL West
1. Los Angeles Dodgers (99-63). Anything less than 95 wins should be seen as a massive disappointment. Money can't buy happiness, but it can buy a sterling pitching rotation with depth. The cost of such a rotation is mind-numbing: Clayton Kershaw ($22M - he's at $30M+ for the following six years), Zack Greinke ($24M), Hyun-Jin Ryu ($3.5M), Dan Haren ($10M), Paul Maholm ($6.5M assuming he meets likely incentives), Josh Beckett ($15.75M), and Chad Billingsley ($12M) combine to cost $93.75M in 2014, making their top seven starters the 17th highest team payroll in MLB. The offense has oodles of star power with the likes of Matt Kemp on the outside looking in.
2. San Francisco Giants (88-74). There's not much pitching depth beyond the top five, but the lineup is as strong as it has been in years with Pablo Sandoval's contract year propelling the unit.
3. Arizona Diamondbacks (85-77). The loss of Patrick Corbin is the loss of a playoff spot. The very strong Arizona lineup is complemented well by a very solid, league-average pitching staff that just needs another big arm. Archie Bradley could be that arm, as could Jeff Samardzija. If the Cubs deal Samardzija in 2014, Arizona still makes more sense than anyone else as the Snakes stand so much to gain from such an acquisition.
4. Colorado Rockies (78-84). One way to be an average team is with a strong offense and weak pitching. That has been Colorado's preferred method for basically their entire existence and it will rear its head again in 2014.
5. San Diego Padres (77-85). Average pitching and a below-average lineup does not a contender make.
NL Central
1. St. Louis Cardinals (97-65). Duh. Even though I'm not much of a Peter Bourjos fan, the lineup is incredibly deep with above-average players at every spot. But it's always about the pitching with St. Louis, and 2014 will be yet another confirmation that piles of pitching always win in baseball. Gross.
2. Cincinnati Reds (85-77). The health red flags were everywhere with this team even before Aroldis Chapman's horrific injury. Although the pitching looks good and the offense has some really big bats, I just have a feeling that this is the year Cincinnati struggles.
3. Milwaukee Brewers (82-80). The Brewers are going to surprise a lot of folks with some really good baseball in 2014. Few offenses can match the quartet of Ryan Braun, Carlos Gomez, Jonathan Lucroy, and Jean Segura given their across-the-board contributions. First base has been a massive hole since Prince Fielder left (pun intended), and it will keep them from October.
4. Pittsburgh Pirates (81-81). At least it's another year without being under .500. Gregory Polanco can't get there fast enough as Andrew McCutchen needs another star to help carry the load. The pitching looks good and the lineup looks good too, but outside of McCutchen, there's no greatness to bump them back among the contenders.
5. Chicago Cubs (58-104). It's all part of the plan. Starlin Castro will quiet at least some of his critics with his offensive showing and Javier Baez will inject some much-needed excitement into the fan base in the second half. But the offense is horrendous and the pitching is below-average. When the annual sell off ships out the likes of Nate Schierholtz, Luis Valbuena, Jason Hammel, Carlos Villanueva, and, most importantly, Jeff Samardzija, the club will seriously resemble the above-average AAA squad that they are. By 2016, fans will have a very hard time remembering the 2014 Opening Day lineup.
NL East
1. Washington Nationals (91-71). Anyone else winning this division will be a massive upset. The pitching is strong up top and throughout while the lineup doesn't have a poor bat to be found. It's a strong roster.
2. Atlanta Braves (87-75). Even at 87 wins, this number is a "what could have been?" tally as Kris Medlen and Brandon Beachy will both be sorely missed. The Atlanta offense has a chance to be special, but that requires the reemergence of Dan Uggla and/or B.J. Upton. I wouldn't bet on it.
3. New York Mets (75-87). I think Curtis Granderson will have a good year and David Wright will love having him around. It's a good thing too because little else excites me about this team.
4. Philadelphia Phillies (71-91). The Phillies take a lot of heat in the blogosphere, and they are most likely the worst team in baseball that is actively trying to win. Still, with Cliff Lee, Cole Hamels, and A.J. Burnett, a strong season is possible if....never mind. It's still an offense of Chase Utley - assuming his knees are alright - and nothing else exciting.
5. Miami Marlins (62-100). The Miami offense outside of Giancarlo Stanton is truly dreadful. But the pitching is a different story with a true ace in Jose Fernandez, a young top-of-the-rotation arm in Henderson Alvarez, a solid mid-rotation guy in Nate Eovaldi, a few back-end options in Jacob Turner, Brad Hand, and Tom Koehler all in front of a barrage of pitching prospects headlined by Andrew Heaney. They'll pitch too well to be the league's worst team, even if the offense will be a punishment to the eyes.
Playoffs
Compared to the 2013 postseason, this would see the Yankees and Rangers enter the AL picture at the expense of the Athletics and Indians. In the NL, the Nationals and Giants would kick out the Pirates and Reds. Based on the above records, the playoff tree is as follows:
AL Wild Card: New York Yankees @ Boston. I'll take the Sawks.
NL Wild Card: Atlanta @ San Francisco. Again, I'll go with the home team.
AL Divisional: Boston @ Tampa Bay. I like the Rays in a season, but I'll take Boston in a short series.
Texas @ Detroit. Tigers in a sweep.
NL Divisional: San Francisco @ Los Angeles. The Giants win in the playoffs and there's so much pressure on the Dodgers. Too much.
Washington @ St. Louis. I'll be contrarian and take the Nats.
AL Championship: Boston @ Detroit. The Tigers may be nearing the end, but they'll make the Fall Classic anyway.
NL Championship: San Francisco @ Washington. Nats Nats Nats.
World Series: Detroit v. Washington (home field determined by silly exhibition). The Nats just have the right stuff.
Awards
AL MVP: Mike Trout. Obviously. No projection necessary.
NL MVP: Bryce Harper. It's time and if the Nats are excellent, it'll be due to Harper's excellence. Something like a .290/.385/.540 line with 30+ homers and 15+ steals should do it.
AL Cy Young: David Price. He's healthy and this maybe a contract year with a trade at some point in the next 12 months followed by an extension.
NL Cy Young: Clayton Kershaw. The best of his generation.
AL Rookie of the Year: Masahiro Tanaka. I don't like that Tanaka will be eligible for the award as a professional veteran, but he'll win it anyway.
NL Rookie of the Year: Kolten Wong. He'll narrowly beat out Arizona shortstop Chris Owings thanks to hitting in an excellent lineup and playing the full season.
Draft Order
Based on these results, the top ten draft picks in 2015 will be:
1. Chicago Cubs (58-104)
2. Miami Marlins (62-100)
3. Houston Astros (63-99)
4. Minnesota Twins (70-92)
5. Philadelphia Phillies (71-91)
6. Chicago White Sox (72-90)
7. New York Mets (75-87)
8. Toronto Blue Jays (75-87)
9. Baltimore Orioles (75-87)
10. San Diego Padres (77-85)
Compared to the 2014 draft, only Seattle and Colorado would drop out of the top ten picks with the Padres and Orioles jumping in to take their places.
Tuesday, February 11, 2014
Why Isn't Giancarlo Stanton a Cub Yet?
Obviously the title is a rhetorical question. There are plenty of reasons why Stanton doesn't play for the Cubs with the simplest being that the Marlins own his rights, he is a tremendously talented baseball player, and, like other teams, the Marlins like having tremendously talented baseball players.
The title is there to get your creative juices flowing. This fine piece on Fangraphs explains why the Marlins are overwhelmingly unlikely to keep Stanton long-term. Simply put, he is about to cost the team a whole boatload of money before they're likely to be very good. Further, Stanton is unlikely to sign an extension in Miami given his public frustration with the team's progress or lack thereof. In almost every regard, dealing Stanton is the correct move for the Marlins and dealing him sooner rather than later makes sense for two reasons. First, it maximizes the return given that Stanton has three remaining years of team control. Second, it minimizes Miami's risk that Stanton suffers a serious injury, not an insignificant concern in light of Stanton's hobbled past.
The Cubs and Marlins appear to be on very similar trajectories. Both teams have been staples in the top-10 of the draft and will be for the foreseeable future. Both teams have amassed enviable stocks of prospect talent. And both teams are going to be really, dreadfully bad in 2014. 2015 appears to be a year of hope for both franchises with 2016 circled on the calendar as the year of competitiveness.
Again like the Cubs, the Marlins have some incredible strengths in their farm system that highlight a serious weakness. For the Cubs, offensive talent - particularly in the infield - is a cause for hope while high-level pitching is still lacking, despite an influx of solid pitching depth. For the Marlins, there is some outfield talent and an embarrassment of pitching riches with infield talent almost completely absent.
(A favorite proposal of mine - a one-for-one deal of Albert Almora for Andrew Heaney - still makes sense given the respective systems)
With that in mind, the Cubs and Marlins are very well suited to match up for a massive trade. The proposed deal:
Cubs Get
OF Giancarlo Stanton
Marlins Get
OF Albert Almora
2B/SS Arismendy Alcantara
1B Dan Vogelbach
SP Neil Ramirez
Why the Marlins Do It
The Marlins are well positioned to compete in 2016. They have a heaping mound of pitching prospects with Andrew Heaney, Justin Nicolino, Adam Conley, and Anthony DeSclafani all poised to join reigning Rookie of the Year ace Jose Fernandez and oft-overlooked 24-year-old stud Henderson Alvarez. They have the pieces to have a top of the league rotation in just a couple of years. They also have three plus young outfielders already at the MLB level in Stanton, Christian Yelich, and Jake Marisnick.
The problem lies in the infield. Miami drafted Colin Moran sixth overall last June and they hope to see him manning 3B by the end of next year. However, even if Moran makes it, the rest of the infield is a barren wasteland. There are no players who project as even average contributors in the system.
This deal would solve that in a hurry. Alcantara is a consensus top-100 prospect in MLB (BP: #83. MLB.com: #89) with a five-tool profile that includes some surprising pop and excellent speed. Although he plays 2B in the Cubs' system, he would likely be viewed as an adequate SS just about anywhere else. He should see MLB playing time by this summer, ready to grab a full-time job in 2015 as a leadoff or #2 hitter with plus defense. He plugs a major hole for the Fish.
Vogelbach is a polarizing prospect because he will never be a defensive asset. However, few 20-year-olds have a bat that scouts universally agree will play at the highest level. Vogelbach combines power, hit, and an advanced approach to project as a true asset with his 1B defense and lack of speed curtailing his overall projection. Still, he would take what has been a gaping hole for the Marlins for years (sorry LoMo) and plug it with a big bat.
Neil Ramirez gets thrown into this deal to give the Marlins another interesting piece and because these deals always seem to involve at least four prospects changing hands.
Nonetheless, the marquee acquisition is Almora. The South Florida native is a consensus top-50 prospect (BP: #25. MLB.com: #18) with enough tools plus serious baseball skills that combine for an excellent profile. Almora can hit, projects to add some pop, runs well enough, and covers CF at a high level. The Marlins do have Marcell Ozuna but it remains to be seen whether he will ever get on base enough to play. That question is rarely asked of Almora, who would provide Miami with a face-of-the-franchise type talent given his roots and projection.
The Marlins can't hope to get much more for Stanton than a top-50 prospect (Almora), a top-100 prospect (Alcantara), a top-150 prospect (Vogelbach), and a wild card (Ramirez), especially as Stanton approaches massively expensive years.
Why the Cubs Do It
The superstar. The chance to acquire a player of Stanton's caliber for an extended period of time presents itself maybe once or twice each generation. The Marlins have been the most recent team to ship out a superstar, doing so twice with the deals of Josh Beckett and Miguel Cabrera. The Red Sox and Tigers rode Beckett and Cabrera to four World Series appearances (in the case of Boston, Beckett and then the return for Beckett).
The Cubs have loudly amassed a great collection of high-profile offensive talent. While some of that talent will make it to the highest level, some will not. At some point, cashing in some of the trade chips makes sense. I generally think that the Cubs should wait to see what talent develops, but Stanton presents an exception, a generational power hitting force with on-base ability to boot.
Plugging Stanton into the Cubs' lineup provides the club with a quintet of All-Star caliber position players in addition to some remaining lottery tickets. Obviously the proposed trade above does not include Javier Baez or Kris Bryant. Both players are too close to the Majors to be flipped a la Wil Myers (an awful trade for the Royals the moment it happened) and the proposed package is plenty fair without them. If the Cubs do include Baez or Bryant, they merely fill one hole by creating another.
If the above trade goes down, the Cubs could field the following lineup by June 2014:
CF Ryan Sweeney/Junior Lake
SS Starlin Castro
2B Javier Baez
RF Giancarlo Stanton
1B Anthony Rizzo
LF Kris Bryant
3B Mike Olt
C Welington Castillo
Wow! Sweeney is the oldest member of the group at 29 and Castillo becomes the elder statesman among regulars at 27. Olt faces the pressure cooker at 25 with Christian Villanueva on his heels and Baez and Bryant both capable of handling 3B. The incredible trio of Stanton, Rizzo, and Castro all check in at 24 while Bryant (22) and Baez (21) remain the babies. The core of Stanton, Baez, Bryant, Rizzo, and Castro could conceivably spend the better part of a decade together with the team only needing to fill in around them. Further, such a lineup would give the front office a few years to replenish the farm system while budding stars manned the everyday lineup.
Building the lineup in this way would have the hidden benefit of clarifying the organization's method and timeline for obtaining pitching talent. By putting together a lineup of inexpensive star-caliber players, the club could focus on free agency to acquire pitching talent, making runs at next winter's big arms like Homer Bailey, Justin Masterson, Max Scherzer, Jon Lester, and even James Shields. Signing even one of those starters along with the inevitable Jeff Samardzija extension (Shark will almost certainly stay if the team acquires Stanton) gives the club a rotation of Samardzija-FREE AGENT-Jackson-Wood-COMPETITION over the next couple of years, certainly enough to compete with a vastly improved bullpen and potentially explosive lineup. The finances make it plenty workable.
Wait, Really? How Would the Finances Work?
I'm glad you asked! For the sake of argument, let's assume that the trade is consummated as listed above and that the Cubs respond by signing two pitchers to large contracts: a 5 year, $70M extension for Samardzija (covering '15-'19 at $10M for '15 and $15M per year afterward) and a 5 year, $90M deal for Homer Bailey (covering '15-'19 at $18M per year). The 2015 commitments by position group and projected/actual salary would be as follows (my best estimates for the arbitration salaries and spots where the club will pursue free agents):
C: $3.6M. Castillo ($2.2M), Kottaras ($1.4M)
IF: $14.1M. Rizzo ($5M), Baez ($0.55M), Castro ($6M), Olt ($0.55M), Villanueva ($0.55M), Veteran free agent ($2M)
OF: $14.7M. Stanton ($11M), Sweeney ($2M), Bryant ($0.55M), Lake ($0.6M), Szczur ($0.55M)
SP: $46M. Samardzija ($10M), Bailey ($18M), Jackson ($11M), Wood ($5.5M), Arrieta ($1.5M)
RP: $16.2M. Veras ($5.5M - club option amount), Strop ($1.8M), Vizcaino ($1.6M), Russell ($2.2M), Grimm ($0.55M), Ramirez ($0.55M), Veteran free agent ($4M)
The above roster would count a total of $94.6M. Some of the estimates are tricky - particularly arbitration raises for Stanton, Wood, Castillo, and Arrieta - but $94.6M is a strong estimate for this roster in 2015.
If the Chicago Cubs can't afford a $94.6M MLB payroll in 2015, they may want to rethink the business that they're in.
As the young offensive talent starts getting expensive when the extensions for Rizzo and Castro escalate, Stanton signs a megadeal, and Baez, Bryant, Lake, and Castillo get into the arbitration system, the contract for Jackson will have expired and Bailey's and Samardzija's will be nearing their end. This is an eminently responsible trajectory for the club to take. I'm not sure that the above roster has enough pitching to scare opponents, but average pitching, solid defense, and excellent offense tends to be a recipe for strong seasons particularly considering that the first "wave" of pitching talent should be heading to Chicago around that time in the form of Pierce Johnson, C.J. Edwards, Corey Black, Ivan Pineyro, and Rob Zastryzny.
There are additional sources of expenditures that must be considered, but none of them should stop this plan. For example, the Cubs will eat $14.5M of dead money in 2014, but that number - as of now - drops to $0 in 2015. Looking at the current roster, it is difficult to imagine the team eating money to shed a contract this season. Their spending on the amateur draft and in the international free agent market are capped by the collective bargaining agreement, although the Cubs could employ an extreme spending strategy similar to the one used in 2013 in either avenue (and, hopefully, more efficiently than they did in 2013...but that's another story). The team owes Cuban signees Jorge Soler and Gerardo Concepcion only $2.6M in '15 and $3.6M in '16, the last year of Concepcion's flop of a deal. Soler provides a nice cushion; if Mike Olt can't hack it at 3B, Bryant can slide back to the infield with Soler taking his corner outfield spot. It's important to maintain a strong pipeline.
Simply put, trading for Giancarlo Stanton makes tons of sense from baseball and business perspectives. It makes sense for the Cubs and for the Marlins too, possibly putting the clubs on a postseason collision course with each other.
There is substantial risk for the Cubs in acquiring a player who has missed 85 games over the past two seasons. But the reward of acquiring a 24-year-old with a .265/.354/.535 MLB line including an 11.2% walk rate, a .270 ISO, a huge arm, and a projected 2014 line of .272/.371/.564 including 35 more home runs is undeniably worth it. If anyone is worth such a big risk, it's Stanton.
To answer the question from the title: I don't know. It just makes too much sense for the teams to make the deal.
The title is there to get your creative juices flowing. This fine piece on Fangraphs explains why the Marlins are overwhelmingly unlikely to keep Stanton long-term. Simply put, he is about to cost the team a whole boatload of money before they're likely to be very good. Further, Stanton is unlikely to sign an extension in Miami given his public frustration with the team's progress or lack thereof. In almost every regard, dealing Stanton is the correct move for the Marlins and dealing him sooner rather than later makes sense for two reasons. First, it maximizes the return given that Stanton has three remaining years of team control. Second, it minimizes Miami's risk that Stanton suffers a serious injury, not an insignificant concern in light of Stanton's hobbled past.
The Cubs and Marlins appear to be on very similar trajectories. Both teams have been staples in the top-10 of the draft and will be for the foreseeable future. Both teams have amassed enviable stocks of prospect talent. And both teams are going to be really, dreadfully bad in 2014. 2015 appears to be a year of hope for both franchises with 2016 circled on the calendar as the year of competitiveness.
Again like the Cubs, the Marlins have some incredible strengths in their farm system that highlight a serious weakness. For the Cubs, offensive talent - particularly in the infield - is a cause for hope while high-level pitching is still lacking, despite an influx of solid pitching depth. For the Marlins, there is some outfield talent and an embarrassment of pitching riches with infield talent almost completely absent.
(A favorite proposal of mine - a one-for-one deal of Albert Almora for Andrew Heaney - still makes sense given the respective systems)
With that in mind, the Cubs and Marlins are very well suited to match up for a massive trade. The proposed deal:
Cubs Get
OF Giancarlo Stanton
Marlins Get
OF Albert Almora
2B/SS Arismendy Alcantara
1B Dan Vogelbach
SP Neil Ramirez
Why the Marlins Do It
The Marlins are well positioned to compete in 2016. They have a heaping mound of pitching prospects with Andrew Heaney, Justin Nicolino, Adam Conley, and Anthony DeSclafani all poised to join reigning Rookie of the Year ace Jose Fernandez and oft-overlooked 24-year-old stud Henderson Alvarez. They have the pieces to have a top of the league rotation in just a couple of years. They also have three plus young outfielders already at the MLB level in Stanton, Christian Yelich, and Jake Marisnick.
The problem lies in the infield. Miami drafted Colin Moran sixth overall last June and they hope to see him manning 3B by the end of next year. However, even if Moran makes it, the rest of the infield is a barren wasteland. There are no players who project as even average contributors in the system.
This deal would solve that in a hurry. Alcantara is a consensus top-100 prospect in MLB (BP: #83. MLB.com: #89) with a five-tool profile that includes some surprising pop and excellent speed. Although he plays 2B in the Cubs' system, he would likely be viewed as an adequate SS just about anywhere else. He should see MLB playing time by this summer, ready to grab a full-time job in 2015 as a leadoff or #2 hitter with plus defense. He plugs a major hole for the Fish.
Vogelbach is a polarizing prospect because he will never be a defensive asset. However, few 20-year-olds have a bat that scouts universally agree will play at the highest level. Vogelbach combines power, hit, and an advanced approach to project as a true asset with his 1B defense and lack of speed curtailing his overall projection. Still, he would take what has been a gaping hole for the Marlins for years (sorry LoMo) and plug it with a big bat.
Neil Ramirez gets thrown into this deal to give the Marlins another interesting piece and because these deals always seem to involve at least four prospects changing hands.
Nonetheless, the marquee acquisition is Almora. The South Florida native is a consensus top-50 prospect (BP: #25. MLB.com: #18) with enough tools plus serious baseball skills that combine for an excellent profile. Almora can hit, projects to add some pop, runs well enough, and covers CF at a high level. The Marlins do have Marcell Ozuna but it remains to be seen whether he will ever get on base enough to play. That question is rarely asked of Almora, who would provide Miami with a face-of-the-franchise type talent given his roots and projection.
The Marlins can't hope to get much more for Stanton than a top-50 prospect (Almora), a top-100 prospect (Alcantara), a top-150 prospect (Vogelbach), and a wild card (Ramirez), especially as Stanton approaches massively expensive years.
Why the Cubs Do It
The superstar. The chance to acquire a player of Stanton's caliber for an extended period of time presents itself maybe once or twice each generation. The Marlins have been the most recent team to ship out a superstar, doing so twice with the deals of Josh Beckett and Miguel Cabrera. The Red Sox and Tigers rode Beckett and Cabrera to four World Series appearances (in the case of Boston, Beckett and then the return for Beckett).
The Cubs have loudly amassed a great collection of high-profile offensive talent. While some of that talent will make it to the highest level, some will not. At some point, cashing in some of the trade chips makes sense. I generally think that the Cubs should wait to see what talent develops, but Stanton presents an exception, a generational power hitting force with on-base ability to boot.
Plugging Stanton into the Cubs' lineup provides the club with a quintet of All-Star caliber position players in addition to some remaining lottery tickets. Obviously the proposed trade above does not include Javier Baez or Kris Bryant. Both players are too close to the Majors to be flipped a la Wil Myers (an awful trade for the Royals the moment it happened) and the proposed package is plenty fair without them. If the Cubs do include Baez or Bryant, they merely fill one hole by creating another.
If the above trade goes down, the Cubs could field the following lineup by June 2014:
CF Ryan Sweeney/Junior Lake
SS Starlin Castro
2B Javier Baez
RF Giancarlo Stanton
1B Anthony Rizzo
LF Kris Bryant
3B Mike Olt
C Welington Castillo
Wow! Sweeney is the oldest member of the group at 29 and Castillo becomes the elder statesman among regulars at 27. Olt faces the pressure cooker at 25 with Christian Villanueva on his heels and Baez and Bryant both capable of handling 3B. The incredible trio of Stanton, Rizzo, and Castro all check in at 24 while Bryant (22) and Baez (21) remain the babies. The core of Stanton, Baez, Bryant, Rizzo, and Castro could conceivably spend the better part of a decade together with the team only needing to fill in around them. Further, such a lineup would give the front office a few years to replenish the farm system while budding stars manned the everyday lineup.
Building the lineup in this way would have the hidden benefit of clarifying the organization's method and timeline for obtaining pitching talent. By putting together a lineup of inexpensive star-caliber players, the club could focus on free agency to acquire pitching talent, making runs at next winter's big arms like Homer Bailey, Justin Masterson, Max Scherzer, Jon Lester, and even James Shields. Signing even one of those starters along with the inevitable Jeff Samardzija extension (Shark will almost certainly stay if the team acquires Stanton) gives the club a rotation of Samardzija-FREE AGENT-Jackson-Wood-COMPETITION over the next couple of years, certainly enough to compete with a vastly improved bullpen and potentially explosive lineup. The finances make it plenty workable.
Wait, Really? How Would the Finances Work?
I'm glad you asked! For the sake of argument, let's assume that the trade is consummated as listed above and that the Cubs respond by signing two pitchers to large contracts: a 5 year, $70M extension for Samardzija (covering '15-'19 at $10M for '15 and $15M per year afterward) and a 5 year, $90M deal for Homer Bailey (covering '15-'19 at $18M per year). The 2015 commitments by position group and projected/actual salary would be as follows (my best estimates for the arbitration salaries and spots where the club will pursue free agents):
C: $3.6M. Castillo ($2.2M), Kottaras ($1.4M)
IF: $14.1M. Rizzo ($5M), Baez ($0.55M), Castro ($6M), Olt ($0.55M), Villanueva ($0.55M), Veteran free agent ($2M)
OF: $14.7M. Stanton ($11M), Sweeney ($2M), Bryant ($0.55M), Lake ($0.6M), Szczur ($0.55M)
SP: $46M. Samardzija ($10M), Bailey ($18M), Jackson ($11M), Wood ($5.5M), Arrieta ($1.5M)
RP: $16.2M. Veras ($5.5M - club option amount), Strop ($1.8M), Vizcaino ($1.6M), Russell ($2.2M), Grimm ($0.55M), Ramirez ($0.55M), Veteran free agent ($4M)
The above roster would count a total of $94.6M. Some of the estimates are tricky - particularly arbitration raises for Stanton, Wood, Castillo, and Arrieta - but $94.6M is a strong estimate for this roster in 2015.
If the Chicago Cubs can't afford a $94.6M MLB payroll in 2015, they may want to rethink the business that they're in.
As the young offensive talent starts getting expensive when the extensions for Rizzo and Castro escalate, Stanton signs a megadeal, and Baez, Bryant, Lake, and Castillo get into the arbitration system, the contract for Jackson will have expired and Bailey's and Samardzija's will be nearing their end. This is an eminently responsible trajectory for the club to take. I'm not sure that the above roster has enough pitching to scare opponents, but average pitching, solid defense, and excellent offense tends to be a recipe for strong seasons particularly considering that the first "wave" of pitching talent should be heading to Chicago around that time in the form of Pierce Johnson, C.J. Edwards, Corey Black, Ivan Pineyro, and Rob Zastryzny.
There are additional sources of expenditures that must be considered, but none of them should stop this plan. For example, the Cubs will eat $14.5M of dead money in 2014, but that number - as of now - drops to $0 in 2015. Looking at the current roster, it is difficult to imagine the team eating money to shed a contract this season. Their spending on the amateur draft and in the international free agent market are capped by the collective bargaining agreement, although the Cubs could employ an extreme spending strategy similar to the one used in 2013 in either avenue (and, hopefully, more efficiently than they did in 2013...but that's another story). The team owes Cuban signees Jorge Soler and Gerardo Concepcion only $2.6M in '15 and $3.6M in '16, the last year of Concepcion's flop of a deal. Soler provides a nice cushion; if Mike Olt can't hack it at 3B, Bryant can slide back to the infield with Soler taking his corner outfield spot. It's important to maintain a strong pipeline.
Simply put, trading for Giancarlo Stanton makes tons of sense from baseball and business perspectives. It makes sense for the Cubs and for the Marlins too, possibly putting the clubs on a postseason collision course with each other.
There is substantial risk for the Cubs in acquiring a player who has missed 85 games over the past two seasons. But the reward of acquiring a 24-year-old with a .265/.354/.535 MLB line including an 11.2% walk rate, a .270 ISO, a huge arm, and a projected 2014 line of .272/.371/.564 including 35 more home runs is undeniably worth it. If anyone is worth such a big risk, it's Stanton.
To answer the question from the title: I don't know. It just makes too much sense for the teams to make the deal.
Monday, January 27, 2014
Chicago Cubs Spending Under the Ricketts Family
The purchase of the Chicago Cubs by the Ricketts family finalized in October 2009 was heralded as a new era in Cubs baseball. Many of us - myself included - believed that ownership by a family invested in the team's fortunes as opposed to by a corporate conglomerate would elevate the franchise to greater heights, particularly given the family's supposed financial wherewithal.
The new ownership was expected to commit substantial resources to the on-field product in addition to renovating Wrigley Field.
Needless to say, things haven't gone exactly as planned. While the Yankees celebrated the signing of Japanese righty Masahiro Tanaka this week, the major Cubs news involved the filing of a lawsuit against the team by rooftop owners across the street from Wrigley Field. The on-field product has receded to depths previously unseen even by the Cubs. Recently fired hand-picked manager Dale Sveum compiled the worst winning percentage in Cubs history by a full-time manager who oversaw the team for at least two seasons. Much of the promise of the Theo Epstein/Jed Hoyer/Jason McLeod hiring has yielded to despair as the team has compiled just a 127-197 record in two years, a stunningly awful .392 winning percentage.
Just how bad has it gotten? The Cubs 127-197 is worse than the Boston Red Sox's records were good in their two World Series-winning campaigns under Epstein, Hoyer, and McLeod: the Red Sox combined to go 194-131 (.597) in 2004 and 2007.
Perhaps just as importantly, Cubs attendance is down from a franchise-high 3,300,200 in 2008 all the way to a 15-year low of just 2,642,682 in 2013. This comes as the Cubs prepare to negotiate a substantial portion of their television contract and as the club seeks city support in green-lighting their Wrigley renovations.
But not all is lost. The team has amassed an enviable collection of amateur talent, acquiring prospects through trades, the amateur draft, and international amateur free agency in Latin America and East Asia. The core that many hoped would be ready in 2014 looks more likely to be established in 2016, but it is in place nonetheless.
However, the team needs to supplement that core with MLB-ready talent. This reality made the Tanaka whiff that much more damaging. As the team now looks to next offseason to add significant pitching talent - and with a bumper crop of free agent pitching available next winter including Cincinnati's Homer Bailey, Detroit's Max Scherzer, Cleveland's Justin Masterson, Boston's Jon Lester, Kansas City's James Shields, and Japan's Kenta Maeda - fans are right to wonder if the new ownership actually has the financial might to compete in the marketplace.
With that in mind, I thought it would be a useful and enlightening exercise to examine the team's player personnel spending over the past few years. This does not consider capital improvements - like the new Dominican academy, the Cubs portion of the new Spring Training facility in Mesa, and the Wrigley Field improvements - or other sources of spending such as front office costs.
The Methodology
I broke spending down into four categories: the Opening Day 40-man roster, international free agent bonuses (and salaries in some cases), amateur draft bonuses, and dead money. I treated signing bonuses as actually paid in the year of contract. I also assigned at least a then-league-minimum salary to every member of the 40-man roster.
There are imperfections with this approach. For example, it doesn't consider mid-season transactions that add salary - like the acquisition of Rich Harden and Chad Gaudin in 2008 - or those that ship out salary - like the trade of Scott Feldman to Baltimore in 2013.
There are some invaluable resources out there, most notably Cot's. Perfect Game also provides signing bonuses for picks in the first 10 rounds of the amateur draft. For both the draft and international free agency, I compiled all bonuses of at least $100K then made an estimate of the additional amount spent in each avenue beginning with $1.5M in 2007 and increasing $100K each year. While this likely misstates the actual spending in any given year, it should approximate the totals.
Here is a year-by-year snapshot dating to 2007 - the final year of Tribune Co. ownership - with the annual spending in each category through the estimated 2014 season.
2007
40-man: $112,633,999
International Bonuses/Salaries: $2,720,000
Draft Bonuses: $6,307,250
Dead Money: $0
TOTAL: $121,661,249
2007 is an excellent jumping-off point as it tracks the ownership changes and coincides with the beginning of the most successful two-year stretch for the club in decades. The spending spree prior to the season that saw the addition of Alfonso Soriano, Ted Lilly, Jason Marquis, and Mark DeRosa to a strong, in-prime core of Carlos Zambrano, Derrek Lee, Aramis Ramirez, and Ryan Dempster pushed the payroll up into big boy territory. However, minimal spending on amateur talent - I'm quite confident that my generous $1.5M estimates on both categories propped up even smaller numbers - portended of the prospect dearth that would plague the franchise for the next half decade or longer. That number includes a $3.2M bonus for Josh Vitters. The only larger bonuses in the 2007 draft went to #1 pick LHP David Price ($6M), #2 pick 3B Mike Moustakas ($4M), #5 pick C Matt Wieters ($6M), #27 pick RHP Rick Porcello ($3.58M), and #30 pick RHP Andrew Brackman ($3.35M). It's not as if the Cubs were terribly cheap, yet they clearly had no adopted the spending approach of the Tigers, Red Sox, and Yankees who loaded up on mid-round talent like Will Middlebrooks and Anthony Rizzo.
2008
40-man: $130,621,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $3,740,000
Draft Bonuses: $6,004,500
Dead Money: $0
TOTAL: $140,365,500
2008 saw a sizable jump in overall spending, almost exclusively from expenses at the MLB level. The most notable salary increases came from Kosuke Fukudome's free agent deal and extensions for Ryan Dempster and Carlos Zambrano. Amateur spending - particularly internationally - continued to lag behind that of major market clubs, although few of us cared as the team enjoyed its most successful season since 1945 playing to a .602 winning percentage.
2009
40-man: $139,226,500
International Bonuses/Salaries: $4,725,000
Draft Bonuses: $4,894,700
Dead Money: $2,653,279
TOTAL: $151,499,479
Payroll increased nearly $10M over the 2008 spending total, yet the team struggled through an 83-78 year that spelled the beginning of the end for Lou Piniella's tenure. The team actually made some noticeable international signings in the final year before the Ricketts family took control.
2010
40-man: $142,874,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $6,975,000
Draft Bonuses: $5,136,000
Dead Money: $1,500,000
TOTAL: $156,485,000
The spending transition began in 2010, although it wasn't immediately clear based on the MLB payroll. The team sank to a 75-87 record despite the all-time high 40-man payroll. International amateur spending reached a new high although the club once again failed to take advantage of unlimited draft spending in the manner employed by major players.
2011
40-man: $137,886,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $7,020,000
Draft Bonuses: $13,399,000
Dead Money: $0
TOTAL: $158,305,000
The top year of total spending, although only by a slight margin over 2010. The team's 71-91 record spelled the end of Jim Hendry's tenure as GM. The Ricketts clearly put their stamp on amateur spending, however, beginning the process of restocking the farm system with a slew of high-profile additions including:
- $1.6M to sign 2nd round pick 1B Dan Vogelbach
- $2.5M to sign 14th round pick RHP Dillon Maples away from a dual-sport commitment to UNC
- $1.6M to sign Venezuelan C Mark Malave
- $1.1M to sign Dominican SS Luis Acosta
2012
40-man: $96,906,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $15,270,000
Draft Bonuses: $10,323,700
Dead Money: $15,500,000
TOTAL: $137,999,700
The first appearance of massive dead money, this iteration in the form of year five of Carlos Zambrano's deal. The 40-man payroll plummeted as did the team's fortunes in an insufferable 101-loss season. Despite the new cap on draft spending, the Cubs were still able to spend significantly thanks to their sixth-worst record in 2011. A well-managed bonus pool enabled the club to sign RHP Duane Underwood away from his University of Georgia commitment.
The much more significant spending took place on the international front. The team signed Cuban lefty Gerardo Concepcion to an almost-immediately regretted five year, $6M contract. However, they more than offset that signing by grabbing fellow Cuban OF Jorge Soler and Dominican RHP Juan Carlos Paniagua in a final international spending spree...or so we thought.
2013
40-man: $94,504,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $12,345,000
Draft Bonuses: $13,533,400
Dead Money: $0
TOTAL: $120,382,400
40-man spending decreased slightly and overall spending returned to the 2007 level despite the massive influx of cash into the game. However, the spending locations changed dramatically with nearly $26M spent on amateurs. The club wisely spent freely in Latin America and East Asia, incurring only one-year restrictions in maximum bonuses that may be awarded en route to signing the top two Latin American talents: Dominican OF Eloy Jimenez and Venezuelan SS Gleyber Torres. The club signed three other Latin American youths for at least $270,000, the nabbed Taiwanese RHP Jen-Ho Tseng for $1.625M. Proving that they were not fully satisfied, the Cubs reportedly nabbed Venezuelan SS Wladimir Galindo in late December, although his signing has not been confirmed and terms are not available (I estimated his bonus to be comparable to others ranked in the 21-30 range of the top international free agents). The team also made excellent work of their amateur draft bonus pool, saving enough in the first ten rounds to grab 12th round pick RHP Trevor Clifton for $375,000 without incurring any loss of picks.
2014
40-man: $70,420,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $4,800,000
Draft Bonuses: $11,700,000
Dead Money: $14,500,000
TOTAL: $101,420,000
The 2013 spending made plenty of sense for a team looking to further bolster its amateur talent. However, 2014 is a peculiarly low total given the Cubs' rank in annual revenue (4th), overall franchise value (4th), and operating income (1st) in 2013. The team cannot sign any international amateur free agents to a bonus of greater than $250,000 in the 2014 cycle, so international spending is likely to decrease substantially as I have predicted. Draft spending should remain high given that the Cubs again pick in the top-five in 2014.
So What Does It All Mean?
I was fiery hot with anger (and sadness) when word broke that the Cubs missed out on Tanaka. It's a good thing that analyzing the spending took a few days.
I have been very critical of the Ricketts for not pursuing every avenue to obtain new talent. The trades of previously under-contract veterans like Ryan Dempster and Matt Garza don't actually add talent to the organization; they simply convert current MLB-caliber talent into (hopefully) future MLB-caliber talent. The trades were good ideas at the time and they look like ever better ideas now. Still, in order to actually increase the talent level, new talent has to come in without old talent leaving.
The Ricketts have been aggressive with that approach, particularly internationally where fewer dollars can have a significant impact. The Cubs have been among the heaviest spenders internationally in the last few years with Jorge Soler the crown jewel of said spending. After losing much of 2011 to the defecting/signing process and 2013 to injury, 2014 is a big year in his development. Regardless, he is a great investment for the club. It's difficult to find guys with lethal throwing arms and the ability to hit fifth in a championship lineup. Soler was acquired with substantial risk but at the cost of only money. That's efficiency.
With amateur international spending seriously curtailed this year by the new rules and with a seriously chopped 40-man payroll, I expected the Cubs to make a big addition this offseason of a player who could help in 2015 and beyond. Tanaka made the most sense to me, but a big move for Robinson Cano did too as his lefty power bat would complement the developing barrage of right-handed talent in the system. Sure, the last few year's of Cano's deal figure to eat up more payroll than he will be worth, but the money was there, the need was obvious, and the talent is extreme. At this point, I don't believe that any of the remaining free agents justify their cost, particularly that of the team's 2014 2nd round draft pick.
That leaves them looking to two spots: back to the international marketplace and the 2015 offseason. I was ready to tar-and-feather the Ricketts based on how this offseason has played out. But after taking a step back, I can appreciate that this offseason might just be one last necessary evil in the master plan.
It does mean that the Ricketts aren't willing to spend on a lose that will almost certainly be a loser without massive upgrades all over the place. With the prospect talent projected to grace Wrigley Field at various points in 2014, this isn't an unfounded approach.
The team can use the 2014 season to gather significantly more information about players, answering such questions as:
1. Is Arodys Vizcaino actually healthy enough to pitch?
2. Was Mike Olt's 2013 an inexplicable blip in the road (even with the eye issue) or the new normal?
3. Can Junior Lake be an everyday outfielder or at least a super sub?
4. Can Justin Grimm harness his strong arsenal to slide into the rotation or at least into a long-term bullpen role?
5. Can Neil Ramirez take the next step that has alluded him?
6. Can Kyle Hendricks spin his underwhelming stuff with enough command to make it at the MLB level?
7. Can Jake Arrieta ever put it together?
8. Just how much of a mirage was Travis Wood in 2013?
The answer to each question has a significant impact on the long-term approach of the front office. If Vizcaino returns with force (as his mid-90s fastball and power hook suggest), the team should be set at the back of the bullpen. If Olt's power stroke returns and he continues to draw walks while being a plus defender at 3B, Christian Villanueva can be packaged in a trade and Kris Bryant projects as a corner outfielder, reducing the need for an outfield acquisition. If Lake progresses and looks good for 500 plate appearances, finding a utility man is less important. If Grimm, Ramirez, or Hendricks takes a big step and grabs hold of a rotation job, the need for a serviceable starter evaporates. If Arrieta miraculously figures it out or Wood settles in as a solid starter instead of a lucky one, perhaps the need for multiple starters morphs into the need for just one, pushing the Cubs to look to one of the premier arms next winter.
I expect the Cubs to be players for new free agent Cuban C Yenier Bello, although Bello doesn't appear to be an upgrade over Welington Castillo. Stashing Bello at AAA while he gets some stateside games under his belt seems wise, and the Cubs desperately need to find some catching talent in a system bereft of it after Castillo and George Kottaras.
But the more important short- and long-term acquisitions must come in the form of a top starting pitcher or two next winter. Without such an addition, the Cubs will be stuck attempting to compile a rotation from a group of mid-level arms, a tactic that has worked precisely zero times in the history of baseball. With that big arm or two added in? The Ricketts enjoy restored credibility as the team enjoys a return to relevance.
Ricketts family, we're waiting.
The new ownership was expected to commit substantial resources to the on-field product in addition to renovating Wrigley Field.
Needless to say, things haven't gone exactly as planned. While the Yankees celebrated the signing of Japanese righty Masahiro Tanaka this week, the major Cubs news involved the filing of a lawsuit against the team by rooftop owners across the street from Wrigley Field. The on-field product has receded to depths previously unseen even by the Cubs. Recently fired hand-picked manager Dale Sveum compiled the worst winning percentage in Cubs history by a full-time manager who oversaw the team for at least two seasons. Much of the promise of the Theo Epstein/Jed Hoyer/Jason McLeod hiring has yielded to despair as the team has compiled just a 127-197 record in two years, a stunningly awful .392 winning percentage.
Just how bad has it gotten? The Cubs 127-197 is worse than the Boston Red Sox's records were good in their two World Series-winning campaigns under Epstein, Hoyer, and McLeod: the Red Sox combined to go 194-131 (.597) in 2004 and 2007.
Perhaps just as importantly, Cubs attendance is down from a franchise-high 3,300,200 in 2008 all the way to a 15-year low of just 2,642,682 in 2013. This comes as the Cubs prepare to negotiate a substantial portion of their television contract and as the club seeks city support in green-lighting their Wrigley renovations.
But not all is lost. The team has amassed an enviable collection of amateur talent, acquiring prospects through trades, the amateur draft, and international amateur free agency in Latin America and East Asia. The core that many hoped would be ready in 2014 looks more likely to be established in 2016, but it is in place nonetheless.
However, the team needs to supplement that core with MLB-ready talent. This reality made the Tanaka whiff that much more damaging. As the team now looks to next offseason to add significant pitching talent - and with a bumper crop of free agent pitching available next winter including Cincinnati's Homer Bailey, Detroit's Max Scherzer, Cleveland's Justin Masterson, Boston's Jon Lester, Kansas City's James Shields, and Japan's Kenta Maeda - fans are right to wonder if the new ownership actually has the financial might to compete in the marketplace.
With that in mind, I thought it would be a useful and enlightening exercise to examine the team's player personnel spending over the past few years. This does not consider capital improvements - like the new Dominican academy, the Cubs portion of the new Spring Training facility in Mesa, and the Wrigley Field improvements - or other sources of spending such as front office costs.
The Methodology
I broke spending down into four categories: the Opening Day 40-man roster, international free agent bonuses (and salaries in some cases), amateur draft bonuses, and dead money. I treated signing bonuses as actually paid in the year of contract. I also assigned at least a then-league-minimum salary to every member of the 40-man roster.
There are imperfections with this approach. For example, it doesn't consider mid-season transactions that add salary - like the acquisition of Rich Harden and Chad Gaudin in 2008 - or those that ship out salary - like the trade of Scott Feldman to Baltimore in 2013.
There are some invaluable resources out there, most notably Cot's. Perfect Game also provides signing bonuses for picks in the first 10 rounds of the amateur draft. For both the draft and international free agency, I compiled all bonuses of at least $100K then made an estimate of the additional amount spent in each avenue beginning with $1.5M in 2007 and increasing $100K each year. While this likely misstates the actual spending in any given year, it should approximate the totals.
Here is a year-by-year snapshot dating to 2007 - the final year of Tribune Co. ownership - with the annual spending in each category through the estimated 2014 season.
2007
40-man: $112,633,999
International Bonuses/Salaries: $2,720,000
Draft Bonuses: $6,307,250
Dead Money: $0
TOTAL: $121,661,249
2007 is an excellent jumping-off point as it tracks the ownership changes and coincides with the beginning of the most successful two-year stretch for the club in decades. The spending spree prior to the season that saw the addition of Alfonso Soriano, Ted Lilly, Jason Marquis, and Mark DeRosa to a strong, in-prime core of Carlos Zambrano, Derrek Lee, Aramis Ramirez, and Ryan Dempster pushed the payroll up into big boy territory. However, minimal spending on amateur talent - I'm quite confident that my generous $1.5M estimates on both categories propped up even smaller numbers - portended of the prospect dearth that would plague the franchise for the next half decade or longer. That number includes a $3.2M bonus for Josh Vitters. The only larger bonuses in the 2007 draft went to #1 pick LHP David Price ($6M), #2 pick 3B Mike Moustakas ($4M), #5 pick C Matt Wieters ($6M), #27 pick RHP Rick Porcello ($3.58M), and #30 pick RHP Andrew Brackman ($3.35M). It's not as if the Cubs were terribly cheap, yet they clearly had no adopted the spending approach of the Tigers, Red Sox, and Yankees who loaded up on mid-round talent like Will Middlebrooks and Anthony Rizzo.
2008
40-man: $130,621,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $3,740,000
Draft Bonuses: $6,004,500
Dead Money: $0
TOTAL: $140,365,500
2008 saw a sizable jump in overall spending, almost exclusively from expenses at the MLB level. The most notable salary increases came from Kosuke Fukudome's free agent deal and extensions for Ryan Dempster and Carlos Zambrano. Amateur spending - particularly internationally - continued to lag behind that of major market clubs, although few of us cared as the team enjoyed its most successful season since 1945 playing to a .602 winning percentage.
2009
40-man: $139,226,500
International Bonuses/Salaries: $4,725,000
Draft Bonuses: $4,894,700
Dead Money: $2,653,279
TOTAL: $151,499,479
Payroll increased nearly $10M over the 2008 spending total, yet the team struggled through an 83-78 year that spelled the beginning of the end for Lou Piniella's tenure. The team actually made some noticeable international signings in the final year before the Ricketts family took control.
2010
40-man: $142,874,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $6,975,000
Draft Bonuses: $5,136,000
Dead Money: $1,500,000
TOTAL: $156,485,000
The spending transition began in 2010, although it wasn't immediately clear based on the MLB payroll. The team sank to a 75-87 record despite the all-time high 40-man payroll. International amateur spending reached a new high although the club once again failed to take advantage of unlimited draft spending in the manner employed by major players.
2011
40-man: $137,886,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $7,020,000
Draft Bonuses: $13,399,000
Dead Money: $0
TOTAL: $158,305,000
The top year of total spending, although only by a slight margin over 2010. The team's 71-91 record spelled the end of Jim Hendry's tenure as GM. The Ricketts clearly put their stamp on amateur spending, however, beginning the process of restocking the farm system with a slew of high-profile additions including:
- $1.6M to sign 2nd round pick 1B Dan Vogelbach
- $2.5M to sign 14th round pick RHP Dillon Maples away from a dual-sport commitment to UNC
- $1.6M to sign Venezuelan C Mark Malave
- $1.1M to sign Dominican SS Luis Acosta
2012
40-man: $96,906,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $15,270,000
Draft Bonuses: $10,323,700
Dead Money: $15,500,000
TOTAL: $137,999,700
The first appearance of massive dead money, this iteration in the form of year five of Carlos Zambrano's deal. The 40-man payroll plummeted as did the team's fortunes in an insufferable 101-loss season. Despite the new cap on draft spending, the Cubs were still able to spend significantly thanks to their sixth-worst record in 2011. A well-managed bonus pool enabled the club to sign RHP Duane Underwood away from his University of Georgia commitment.
The much more significant spending took place on the international front. The team signed Cuban lefty Gerardo Concepcion to an almost-immediately regretted five year, $6M contract. However, they more than offset that signing by grabbing fellow Cuban OF Jorge Soler and Dominican RHP Juan Carlos Paniagua in a final international spending spree...or so we thought.
2013
40-man: $94,504,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $12,345,000
Draft Bonuses: $13,533,400
Dead Money: $0
TOTAL: $120,382,400
40-man spending decreased slightly and overall spending returned to the 2007 level despite the massive influx of cash into the game. However, the spending locations changed dramatically with nearly $26M spent on amateurs. The club wisely spent freely in Latin America and East Asia, incurring only one-year restrictions in maximum bonuses that may be awarded en route to signing the top two Latin American talents: Dominican OF Eloy Jimenez and Venezuelan SS Gleyber Torres. The club signed three other Latin American youths for at least $270,000, the nabbed Taiwanese RHP Jen-Ho Tseng for $1.625M. Proving that they were not fully satisfied, the Cubs reportedly nabbed Venezuelan SS Wladimir Galindo in late December, although his signing has not been confirmed and terms are not available (I estimated his bonus to be comparable to others ranked in the 21-30 range of the top international free agents). The team also made excellent work of their amateur draft bonus pool, saving enough in the first ten rounds to grab 12th round pick RHP Trevor Clifton for $375,000 without incurring any loss of picks.
2014
40-man: $70,420,000
International Bonuses/Salaries: $4,800,000
Draft Bonuses: $11,700,000
Dead Money: $14,500,000
TOTAL: $101,420,000
The 2013 spending made plenty of sense for a team looking to further bolster its amateur talent. However, 2014 is a peculiarly low total given the Cubs' rank in annual revenue (4th), overall franchise value (4th), and operating income (1st) in 2013. The team cannot sign any international amateur free agents to a bonus of greater than $250,000 in the 2014 cycle, so international spending is likely to decrease substantially as I have predicted. Draft spending should remain high given that the Cubs again pick in the top-five in 2014.
So What Does It All Mean?
I was fiery hot with anger (and sadness) when word broke that the Cubs missed out on Tanaka. It's a good thing that analyzing the spending took a few days.
I have been very critical of the Ricketts for not pursuing every avenue to obtain new talent. The trades of previously under-contract veterans like Ryan Dempster and Matt Garza don't actually add talent to the organization; they simply convert current MLB-caliber talent into (hopefully) future MLB-caliber talent. The trades were good ideas at the time and they look like ever better ideas now. Still, in order to actually increase the talent level, new talent has to come in without old talent leaving.
The Ricketts have been aggressive with that approach, particularly internationally where fewer dollars can have a significant impact. The Cubs have been among the heaviest spenders internationally in the last few years with Jorge Soler the crown jewel of said spending. After losing much of 2011 to the defecting/signing process and 2013 to injury, 2014 is a big year in his development. Regardless, he is a great investment for the club. It's difficult to find guys with lethal throwing arms and the ability to hit fifth in a championship lineup. Soler was acquired with substantial risk but at the cost of only money. That's efficiency.
With amateur international spending seriously curtailed this year by the new rules and with a seriously chopped 40-man payroll, I expected the Cubs to make a big addition this offseason of a player who could help in 2015 and beyond. Tanaka made the most sense to me, but a big move for Robinson Cano did too as his lefty power bat would complement the developing barrage of right-handed talent in the system. Sure, the last few year's of Cano's deal figure to eat up more payroll than he will be worth, but the money was there, the need was obvious, and the talent is extreme. At this point, I don't believe that any of the remaining free agents justify their cost, particularly that of the team's 2014 2nd round draft pick.
That leaves them looking to two spots: back to the international marketplace and the 2015 offseason. I was ready to tar-and-feather the Ricketts based on how this offseason has played out. But after taking a step back, I can appreciate that this offseason might just be one last necessary evil in the master plan.
It does mean that the Ricketts aren't willing to spend on a lose that will almost certainly be a loser without massive upgrades all over the place. With the prospect talent projected to grace Wrigley Field at various points in 2014, this isn't an unfounded approach.
The team can use the 2014 season to gather significantly more information about players, answering such questions as:
1. Is Arodys Vizcaino actually healthy enough to pitch?
2. Was Mike Olt's 2013 an inexplicable blip in the road (even with the eye issue) or the new normal?
3. Can Junior Lake be an everyday outfielder or at least a super sub?
4. Can Justin Grimm harness his strong arsenal to slide into the rotation or at least into a long-term bullpen role?
5. Can Neil Ramirez take the next step that has alluded him?
6. Can Kyle Hendricks spin his underwhelming stuff with enough command to make it at the MLB level?
7. Can Jake Arrieta ever put it together?
8. Just how much of a mirage was Travis Wood in 2013?
The answer to each question has a significant impact on the long-term approach of the front office. If Vizcaino returns with force (as his mid-90s fastball and power hook suggest), the team should be set at the back of the bullpen. If Olt's power stroke returns and he continues to draw walks while being a plus defender at 3B, Christian Villanueva can be packaged in a trade and Kris Bryant projects as a corner outfielder, reducing the need for an outfield acquisition. If Lake progresses and looks good for 500 plate appearances, finding a utility man is less important. If Grimm, Ramirez, or Hendricks takes a big step and grabs hold of a rotation job, the need for a serviceable starter evaporates. If Arrieta miraculously figures it out or Wood settles in as a solid starter instead of a lucky one, perhaps the need for multiple starters morphs into the need for just one, pushing the Cubs to look to one of the premier arms next winter.
I expect the Cubs to be players for new free agent Cuban C Yenier Bello, although Bello doesn't appear to be an upgrade over Welington Castillo. Stashing Bello at AAA while he gets some stateside games under his belt seems wise, and the Cubs desperately need to find some catching talent in a system bereft of it after Castillo and George Kottaras.
But the more important short- and long-term acquisitions must come in the form of a top starting pitcher or two next winter. Without such an addition, the Cubs will be stuck attempting to compile a rotation from a group of mid-level arms, a tactic that has worked precisely zero times in the history of baseball. With that big arm or two added in? The Ricketts enjoy restored credibility as the team enjoys a return to relevance.
Ricketts family, we're waiting.
Friday, December 6, 2013
Taking Stock of the Chicago Cubs
In advance of next week's Winter Meetings in Orlando and partly as a result of the flurry of activity on Tuesday, my brother and I have enjoyed an aggressive back-and-forth regarding the state of the Cubs. We have approached the current status of the franchise from different points of view. While we both believe that genuine contention lies in 2016 with a strongly competitive team capable of progressing early and competing in 2015, we disagree on what current steps should be taken to help the team reach that goal. Or at least we used to.
I have repeatedly contended that this offseason represents the best opportunity for big-time upgrading given the presence of marquee talent on the market and the club's guaranteed protected #4 overall selection in next June's draft. The opposing view? The 2014 Cubs aren't going to compete yet, so what's the point of spending now instead of later?
There are plenty of business reasons for spending now with a trio standing out. First, as happened with the Yankees last year, attendance is way down at Wrigley Field. After Cubs fans tasted winning somewhat regularly in the 2000s, the 2010s have been a massive letdown. It would certainly help to pack the ballpark again.
The other two business reasons are more important to the team's bottom line. The second reason: a competitive team that generates interest from Chicagoans could significantly increase the odds of obtaining city approval for major renovations of the stadium and Wrigleyville area. And third, the club's television rights contract is up for grabs in 12 months. Higher ratings equal big dollars there.
But even with all of that in the open, the baseball reasons for spending now instead of next year are extremely compelling. In order to convey that in full, three realities must be clearly understood:
1. The Cubs are historically bad and devoid of talent at the MLB level, having just lost the most games ever at the MLB level over a two year stretch;
2. There is serious, impact talent in the pipeline set to reach Wrigley Field in the 2014 and 2015 seasons; and
3. Unlike in years past, the Cubs do not have significant financial resources committed well into the future.
The third point merits a deeper look. In latter portion of the last decade, the club made a series of massive, long-term salary commitments to players including Carlos Zambrano (5 years, $90M), Ryan Dempster (4 years, $52M), Ted Lilly (4 years, $40M), Jason Marquis (3 years, $21M), Carlos Marmol (3 years, $20M), Alfonso Soriano (8 years, $136M), Aramis Ramirez (5 years, $75M), Derrek Lee (5 years, $65M), Kosuke Fukudome (4 years, $48M), and Milton Bradley (3 years, $30M).
The current Cubs? They carry only one such deal at this point: the remaining 3 years and $33M on Edwin Jackson's deal (I am presuming that the signing bonus was paid up front). There is some dead money on the 2014 payroll, namely $14M for Alfonso Soriano, $1.2M for Gerardo Concepcion (also in 2015), and roughly $500K for Scott Hairston.
This is a franchise in a much different position than it was in three years ago when the payroll ballooned to $144.3M for a 75-87 disappointment.
With this foundational understanding of the state of the franchise, my brother made a comment that spurred a detailed comeback from me. I have criticized him repeatedly for not being willing to take bold steps to improve the team this offseason. Translation: he doesn't want the Cubs to spend any money in free agency, instead preferring bargain bin shopping and trades. I have countered with the reasons given below, as well as the idea that the team lacks sufficient talent to trade for impact talent: when you're short on talent everywhere, you can't use what little you have to plug a hole because it just creates another one.
Anyway, in response to my questioning why he doesn't want the team to win in 2014 if possible, he rose the idea of the team signing Robinson Cano, Masahiro Tanaka, Matt Garza, Curtis Granderson, and Grant Balfour this offseason so that we could enjoy watching a competitive team in 2014, lamenting that it would be against the team's long-term interest. He said, "I know it's dumb to make some major expenditures with where we are at this point."
And that was it; I had my opening.
See, it's not nearly as crazy as it sounds for the Cubs to go on a massive spending spree. Here are projected contracts required to sign the five free agents listed above:
Cano: 8 years, $200M
Tanaka: 7 years, $110M plus $20M posting fee (given the new cap, the player will get more)
Garza: 5 years, $80M
Granderson: 4 years, $62M
Balfour: 3 years, $24M
The Granderson number feels a bit high while Garza may be a bit low; regardless, these deals are in the ballpark.
There's no way the Cubs could actually absorb such enormous expenditures, right? Here's a look at the 2014 roster without any major additions:
LF Lake ($.5M)
SS Castro ($6M)
1B Rizzo ($3M)
RF Schierholtz ($3.8M)
CF Sweeney ($1.5M)
C Castillo ($.5M)
3B Valbuena ($1.5M)
2B Barney ($2M)
SP1 Samardzija ($4.9M)
SP2 Jackson ($13M)
SP3 Wood ($3.6M)
SP4 Arrieta ($.5M)
SP5 Rusin ($.5M)
Bench: C Kottaras ($1M), INF Murphy ($1M), 3B Olt ($.5M), OF Bogusevic ($.5M), McDonald ($.5M)
Bullpen: Strop ($1M), Russell ($1.7M), Wright ($1.5M), Parker ($.5M), Vizcaino ($.5M), Arrieta ($.5M), Grimm ($.5M), Villanueva ($5M)
Dead Money/Prospects: Soriano ($14M), Fujikawa ($4.5M), Hairston ($.5M), Soler ($2M), Concepcion ($1.2M)
The lineup costs just $18.8M, the bench $3.5M, the rotation $22.5M, the bullpen $11.2M, and dead money and prospects $22.2M for a total of $78.2M. That's a really terrible roster with a payroll that would have ranked 22nd in 2013, just behind Kansas City and ahead of Minnesota. One of these is not like the others...
Well, after that sobering look at our likely future, here's a look at the 2014 roster with those big salaries added in (I will amortize the posting fee over the life of Tanaka's contract given that I expect the team to finagle his salaries to accomplish the same):
LF Lake ($.5M) / Schierholtz ($3.8M)
SS Castro ($6M)
2B Cano ($25M)
1B Rizzo ($3M)
RF Granderson ($15.5M)
CF Sweeney ($1.5M)
C Castillo ($.5M)
3B Valbuena ($1.5M)
SP1 Samardzija ($4.9M)
SP2 Tanaka ($18.6M)
SP3 Garza ($16M)
SP4 Jackson ($13M)
SP5 Wood ($3.6M)
Bench: C Kottaras ($1M), INF Murphy ($1M), INF Barney ($2M), OF Bogusevic ($.5M), OF Schierholtz (above)
Bullpen: Balfour ($8M), Strop ($1M), Russell ($1.7M), Wright ($1.5M), Parker ($.5M), Vizcaino ($.5M), Arrieta ($.5M)
Dead Money/Prospects: Soriano ($14M), Villanueva ($5M), Fujikawa ($4.5M), Hairston ($.5M), Soler ($2M), Concepcion ($1.2M)
For that 25-man roster, the Cubs would spend $53.5M on the lineup, $8.3M on the bench, $56.1M on the rotation, $13.7M on the bullpen, and $27.2M in dead money and prospect contracts for a total of $158.8M.
The 2010 payroll was $144.3M, so this isn't exactly uncharted territory for the Cubs. This projected number also misses high compared to what the team would realistically do if the five free agents were brought aboard: Villanueva is expendable with Chris Rusin and Justin Grimm available for spot starts and long relief, and Barney is unnecessary with marquee starters at 2B and SS, leaving the club free to unload both salaries for low-level prospects or even just the salary relief alone. Removing that $7M and replacing it with a pair of minimum-salary bodies leaves a payroll of $152.8M. That 2014 club is obviously exponentially better than the product the team is likely to put on the field.
Just as importantly, those players augment the talent the club has coming up through the minors as opposed to blocking it. Here's a look at the 2015 roster with approximate arbitration raises and re-signing Wesley Wright for $1M beyond his 2014 figure:
CF Lake ($.5M)
3B Baez ($.5M)
2B Cano ($25M)
LF Bryant ($.5M)
1B Rizzo ($5M)
RF Granderson ($15.5M)
SS Castro ($7M)
C Castillo ($1.5M)
SP1 Samardzija ($10M)
SP2 Tanaka ($18.6M)
SP3 Garza ($16M)
SP4 Jackson ($13M)
SP5 Wood ($5.5M)
Bench: C Kottaras ($1.3M), IF Alcantara ($.5M), 3B/OF Olt ($.5M), OF Sweeney ($1.5M), OF Szczur ($.5M)
Bullpen: Balfour ($8M), Strop ($1.5M), Russell ($2.2M), Wright ($2.5M), Parker ($.5M), Vizcaino ($1.5M), Arrieta ($1.5M)
Dead Money/Prospects: Fujikawa ($.5M), Soler ($3M), Concepcion ($1.2M)
That roster? The lineup is $55.5M, the bench $4.3M, the rotation $63.1M, the bullpen $17.7M, and dead money and prospect contracts are down to $4.7M. The total? $145.3M.
Under that scenario, as of the end of 2015, the Cubs would have the following guaranteed salary commitments remaining:
Cano: 6 years, $150M
Rizzo: 4 years, $32M (includes $2M paid for 2020 buyout of team option)
Castro: 4 years, $38M (includes $1M paid for 2020 buyout of team option)
Tanaka: 5 years, $92.9M
Garza: 3 years, $48M
Granderson: 2 years, $31M
Jackson: 1 year, $13M
Balfour: 1 year, $8M
Soler: 5 years, $18M
Sweeney: Buyout of team option, $.5M
That 2015 team has the potential for an explosive lineup, top to bottom, and some serious pitching every day. Samardzija would hit free agency and a group of (hopefully) contributors would be well into the arbitration system including Strop, Castillo, Vizcaino, Wood, and Arrieta, but there would be increased flexibility to acquire talent via trade given the amount of in-house options. More importantly, there would be a lot of 2014 and 2015 wins in the rearview mirror.
The 2014 payroll of $158.8M would have ranked fifth in baseball in 2013, roughly $1M behind Philadelphia and just a hair beyond Boston. However, given the rosy long-term outlook for the club, the team payroll likely wouldn't reach the $159M figure again for a few more years given that the team's biggest talent acquisitions will come in the form of cheap, internal options: Javier Baez, Kris Bryant, Jorge Soler, Albert Almora, Arismendy Alcantara, Christian Villanueva, Kyle Hendricks, Pierce Johnson, CJ Edwards, Corey Black, Ivan Pineyro, and even former top prospects turned question marks in Mike Olt and Brett Jackson. There is a ton of talent on the way that will actually help to decrease the payroll over time.
To be clear: I am not proposing that the Cubs sign Cano, Tanaka, Garza, Granderson, and Balfour in the next month. That would cost an enormous amount of someone else's cash plus the club's 2nd and 3rd round draft picks next June. But Cano, Tanaka, and Garza for cash and a 2nd rounder? Yeah, I'm all for it! Removing Granderson and Balfour from the above calculation and replacing them with minimum salary bodies, the 2014 payroll drops to $136.3M and the 2015 number is down to $122.8M. A $122.8M payroll for the Chicago stinkin' Cubs? That's eminently doable: the Cubs were at $134M or more from 2009-2011 and $118.3M in 2008.
The $122.8M figure would have figured tenth in 2013 behind the Yankees, Dodgers, Phillies, Red Sox, Tigers, Giants, Angels, Rangers, and White Sox. The Blue Jays, Cardinals, Nationals, and Reds would have all been within $12M of that number too. By 2015, given inflation and the mounds of cash pouring into the game, a $122.8M payroll should be close to the median figure in the league.
The Cubs' actual payroll peers in 2013? With their revenue rankings in parentheses, the three teams spending just more than the Cubs were St. Louis (7), Washington (13), and Cincinnati (17). The three spending just less were Baltimore (19), Milwaukee (20), and Arizona (24). The Cubs? The Cubs were fourth in revenue.
The moral of this story: don't think that it's crazy for the Cubs to go after a 25-year-old potential #2 starter, a top-2 position player over the last four years (Cano trails only Miguel Cabrera from 2010-2013) who plays a premium position, and another #2/#3 starting pitcher at the same time. It's just absolutely not crazy, not for a team that plays in Chicago owned by billionaires in a sport with millions of additional dollars coming in every year. The Cubs could add Cano or Tanaka using just the amount of increased revenue they'll enjoy in 2014 as a result of MLB's new national television contract. Cano, Tanaka, and Garza would all supplement, not block, the core of prospects making its way to Chicago in the coming years.
The club should actually have even more spending flexibility in 2014 than it may have had without its international shopping spree in 2013. Thanks to the additions of teens Eloy Jimenez, Gleyber Torres, Jen-Ho Tseng, Jefferson Mejia, Erling Moreno, and Johan Matos, the Cubs spent at least $7.8M on international amateur signing bonuses in 2013. While the team will still spend internationally in 2014, their expected bonus outlay is severely restricted by the $250K maximum bonus that the team may offer as a result of the new CBA. Thus, expect the Cubs to spend something like $2M-$3M on amateur targets. If the team also signs two compensation free agents like Cano and Granderson, the Cubs would forfeit their 2nd and 3rd round draft picks and the corresponding bonus pool allocation. Accounting for slight inflation, those picks would be worth about $1.3M and $720K. Taken together, the team would have about $7M less to spend on amateur talent in 2014 than it did in 2013, cash that may be reallocated to other avenues.
There's one additional factor that must be considered having looked at all of the above: the financial state of the team. Much has been made of the heavily debt-financed purchase of the team by the Ricketts family. Thus, any available figures should be taken with a very large grain of salt. Nonetheless, Forbes currently values the Cubs as MLB's fourth most valuable franchise at a value of $1B. The team's 2013 revenue of $274M also ranked fourth. The $32.1M operating income ranked first (although you may wisely question the utility of operating income). Unfortunately, the club also ranks first in a much less appealing category: debt-to-value ratio. The 58% figure is one of just three at 50% or higher and many clubs are in the single digits or at 0%.
Still, the team's revenue increases have been largely immune to the on-field product, increasing steadily from $156M to $274M over the past decade that included a pair of division flags and a quartet of top-10 draft picks.
The team doesn't have to spend its money this offseason and it most likely won't. But don't confuse yourself: it's not crazy to think that they have the resources to do so while fitting acquisitions squarely into gaping holes in the short- and long-term plans. The rule of thumb of baseball payrolls is to spend roughly 50% of revenue. Applying that figure would leave the Cubs with a $137M payroll in 2014, plus half of any gains.
Still think a $152.8M payroll is crazy?
I have repeatedly contended that this offseason represents the best opportunity for big-time upgrading given the presence of marquee talent on the market and the club's guaranteed protected #4 overall selection in next June's draft. The opposing view? The 2014 Cubs aren't going to compete yet, so what's the point of spending now instead of later?
There are plenty of business reasons for spending now with a trio standing out. First, as happened with the Yankees last year, attendance is way down at Wrigley Field. After Cubs fans tasted winning somewhat regularly in the 2000s, the 2010s have been a massive letdown. It would certainly help to pack the ballpark again.
The other two business reasons are more important to the team's bottom line. The second reason: a competitive team that generates interest from Chicagoans could significantly increase the odds of obtaining city approval for major renovations of the stadium and Wrigleyville area. And third, the club's television rights contract is up for grabs in 12 months. Higher ratings equal big dollars there.
But even with all of that in the open, the baseball reasons for spending now instead of next year are extremely compelling. In order to convey that in full, three realities must be clearly understood:
1. The Cubs are historically bad and devoid of talent at the MLB level, having just lost the most games ever at the MLB level over a two year stretch;
2. There is serious, impact talent in the pipeline set to reach Wrigley Field in the 2014 and 2015 seasons; and
3. Unlike in years past, the Cubs do not have significant financial resources committed well into the future.
The third point merits a deeper look. In latter portion of the last decade, the club made a series of massive, long-term salary commitments to players including Carlos Zambrano (5 years, $90M), Ryan Dempster (4 years, $52M), Ted Lilly (4 years, $40M), Jason Marquis (3 years, $21M), Carlos Marmol (3 years, $20M), Alfonso Soriano (8 years, $136M), Aramis Ramirez (5 years, $75M), Derrek Lee (5 years, $65M), Kosuke Fukudome (4 years, $48M), and Milton Bradley (3 years, $30M).
The current Cubs? They carry only one such deal at this point: the remaining 3 years and $33M on Edwin Jackson's deal (I am presuming that the signing bonus was paid up front). There is some dead money on the 2014 payroll, namely $14M for Alfonso Soriano, $1.2M for Gerardo Concepcion (also in 2015), and roughly $500K for Scott Hairston.
This is a franchise in a much different position than it was in three years ago when the payroll ballooned to $144.3M for a 75-87 disappointment.
With this foundational understanding of the state of the franchise, my brother made a comment that spurred a detailed comeback from me. I have criticized him repeatedly for not being willing to take bold steps to improve the team this offseason. Translation: he doesn't want the Cubs to spend any money in free agency, instead preferring bargain bin shopping and trades. I have countered with the reasons given below, as well as the idea that the team lacks sufficient talent to trade for impact talent: when you're short on talent everywhere, you can't use what little you have to plug a hole because it just creates another one.
Anyway, in response to my questioning why he doesn't want the team to win in 2014 if possible, he rose the idea of the team signing Robinson Cano, Masahiro Tanaka, Matt Garza, Curtis Granderson, and Grant Balfour this offseason so that we could enjoy watching a competitive team in 2014, lamenting that it would be against the team's long-term interest. He said, "I know it's dumb to make some major expenditures with where we are at this point."
And that was it; I had my opening.
See, it's not nearly as crazy as it sounds for the Cubs to go on a massive spending spree. Here are projected contracts required to sign the five free agents listed above:
Cano: 8 years, $200M
Tanaka: 7 years, $110M plus $20M posting fee (given the new cap, the player will get more)
Garza: 5 years, $80M
Granderson: 4 years, $62M
Balfour: 3 years, $24M
The Granderson number feels a bit high while Garza may be a bit low; regardless, these deals are in the ballpark.
There's no way the Cubs could actually absorb such enormous expenditures, right? Here's a look at the 2014 roster without any major additions:
LF Lake ($.5M)
SS Castro ($6M)
1B Rizzo ($3M)
RF Schierholtz ($3.8M)
CF Sweeney ($1.5M)
C Castillo ($.5M)
3B Valbuena ($1.5M)
2B Barney ($2M)
SP1 Samardzija ($4.9M)
SP2 Jackson ($13M)
SP3 Wood ($3.6M)
SP4 Arrieta ($.5M)
SP5 Rusin ($.5M)
Bench: C Kottaras ($1M), INF Murphy ($1M), 3B Olt ($.5M), OF Bogusevic ($.5M), McDonald ($.5M)
Bullpen: Strop ($1M), Russell ($1.7M), Wright ($1.5M), Parker ($.5M), Vizcaino ($.5M), Arrieta ($.5M), Grimm ($.5M), Villanueva ($5M)
Dead Money/Prospects: Soriano ($14M), Fujikawa ($4.5M), Hairston ($.5M), Soler ($2M), Concepcion ($1.2M)
The lineup costs just $18.8M, the bench $3.5M, the rotation $22.5M, the bullpen $11.2M, and dead money and prospects $22.2M for a total of $78.2M. That's a really terrible roster with a payroll that would have ranked 22nd in 2013, just behind Kansas City and ahead of Minnesota. One of these is not like the others...
Well, after that sobering look at our likely future, here's a look at the 2014 roster with those big salaries added in (I will amortize the posting fee over the life of Tanaka's contract given that I expect the team to finagle his salaries to accomplish the same):
LF Lake ($.5M) / Schierholtz ($3.8M)
SS Castro ($6M)
2B Cano ($25M)
1B Rizzo ($3M)
RF Granderson ($15.5M)
CF Sweeney ($1.5M)
C Castillo ($.5M)
3B Valbuena ($1.5M)
SP1 Samardzija ($4.9M)
SP2 Tanaka ($18.6M)
SP3 Garza ($16M)
SP4 Jackson ($13M)
SP5 Wood ($3.6M)
Bench: C Kottaras ($1M), INF Murphy ($1M), INF Barney ($2M), OF Bogusevic ($.5M), OF Schierholtz (above)
Bullpen: Balfour ($8M), Strop ($1M), Russell ($1.7M), Wright ($1.5M), Parker ($.5M), Vizcaino ($.5M), Arrieta ($.5M)
Dead Money/Prospects: Soriano ($14M), Villanueva ($5M), Fujikawa ($4.5M), Hairston ($.5M), Soler ($2M), Concepcion ($1.2M)
For that 25-man roster, the Cubs would spend $53.5M on the lineup, $8.3M on the bench, $56.1M on the rotation, $13.7M on the bullpen, and $27.2M in dead money and prospect contracts for a total of $158.8M.
The 2010 payroll was $144.3M, so this isn't exactly uncharted territory for the Cubs. This projected number also misses high compared to what the team would realistically do if the five free agents were brought aboard: Villanueva is expendable with Chris Rusin and Justin Grimm available for spot starts and long relief, and Barney is unnecessary with marquee starters at 2B and SS, leaving the club free to unload both salaries for low-level prospects or even just the salary relief alone. Removing that $7M and replacing it with a pair of minimum-salary bodies leaves a payroll of $152.8M. That 2014 club is obviously exponentially better than the product the team is likely to put on the field.
Just as importantly, those players augment the talent the club has coming up through the minors as opposed to blocking it. Here's a look at the 2015 roster with approximate arbitration raises and re-signing Wesley Wright for $1M beyond his 2014 figure:
CF Lake ($.5M)
3B Baez ($.5M)
2B Cano ($25M)
LF Bryant ($.5M)
1B Rizzo ($5M)
RF Granderson ($15.5M)
SS Castro ($7M)
C Castillo ($1.5M)
SP1 Samardzija ($10M)
SP2 Tanaka ($18.6M)
SP3 Garza ($16M)
SP4 Jackson ($13M)
SP5 Wood ($5.5M)
Bench: C Kottaras ($1.3M), IF Alcantara ($.5M), 3B/OF Olt ($.5M), OF Sweeney ($1.5M), OF Szczur ($.5M)
Bullpen: Balfour ($8M), Strop ($1.5M), Russell ($2.2M), Wright ($2.5M), Parker ($.5M), Vizcaino ($1.5M), Arrieta ($1.5M)
Dead Money/Prospects: Fujikawa ($.5M), Soler ($3M), Concepcion ($1.2M)
That roster? The lineup is $55.5M, the bench $4.3M, the rotation $63.1M, the bullpen $17.7M, and dead money and prospect contracts are down to $4.7M. The total? $145.3M.
Under that scenario, as of the end of 2015, the Cubs would have the following guaranteed salary commitments remaining:
Cano: 6 years, $150M
Rizzo: 4 years, $32M (includes $2M paid for 2020 buyout of team option)
Castro: 4 years, $38M (includes $1M paid for 2020 buyout of team option)
Tanaka: 5 years, $92.9M
Garza: 3 years, $48M
Granderson: 2 years, $31M
Jackson: 1 year, $13M
Balfour: 1 year, $8M
Soler: 5 years, $18M
Sweeney: Buyout of team option, $.5M
That 2015 team has the potential for an explosive lineup, top to bottom, and some serious pitching every day. Samardzija would hit free agency and a group of (hopefully) contributors would be well into the arbitration system including Strop, Castillo, Vizcaino, Wood, and Arrieta, but there would be increased flexibility to acquire talent via trade given the amount of in-house options. More importantly, there would be a lot of 2014 and 2015 wins in the rearview mirror.
The 2014 payroll of $158.8M would have ranked fifth in baseball in 2013, roughly $1M behind Philadelphia and just a hair beyond Boston. However, given the rosy long-term outlook for the club, the team payroll likely wouldn't reach the $159M figure again for a few more years given that the team's biggest talent acquisitions will come in the form of cheap, internal options: Javier Baez, Kris Bryant, Jorge Soler, Albert Almora, Arismendy Alcantara, Christian Villanueva, Kyle Hendricks, Pierce Johnson, CJ Edwards, Corey Black, Ivan Pineyro, and even former top prospects turned question marks in Mike Olt and Brett Jackson. There is a ton of talent on the way that will actually help to decrease the payroll over time.
To be clear: I am not proposing that the Cubs sign Cano, Tanaka, Garza, Granderson, and Balfour in the next month. That would cost an enormous amount of someone else's cash plus the club's 2nd and 3rd round draft picks next June. But Cano, Tanaka, and Garza for cash and a 2nd rounder? Yeah, I'm all for it! Removing Granderson and Balfour from the above calculation and replacing them with minimum salary bodies, the 2014 payroll drops to $136.3M and the 2015 number is down to $122.8M. A $122.8M payroll for the Chicago stinkin' Cubs? That's eminently doable: the Cubs were at $134M or more from 2009-2011 and $118.3M in 2008.
The $122.8M figure would have figured tenth in 2013 behind the Yankees, Dodgers, Phillies, Red Sox, Tigers, Giants, Angels, Rangers, and White Sox. The Blue Jays, Cardinals, Nationals, and Reds would have all been within $12M of that number too. By 2015, given inflation and the mounds of cash pouring into the game, a $122.8M payroll should be close to the median figure in the league.
The Cubs' actual payroll peers in 2013? With their revenue rankings in parentheses, the three teams spending just more than the Cubs were St. Louis (7), Washington (13), and Cincinnati (17). The three spending just less were Baltimore (19), Milwaukee (20), and Arizona (24). The Cubs? The Cubs were fourth in revenue.
The moral of this story: don't think that it's crazy for the Cubs to go after a 25-year-old potential #2 starter, a top-2 position player over the last four years (Cano trails only Miguel Cabrera from 2010-2013) who plays a premium position, and another #2/#3 starting pitcher at the same time. It's just absolutely not crazy, not for a team that plays in Chicago owned by billionaires in a sport with millions of additional dollars coming in every year. The Cubs could add Cano or Tanaka using just the amount of increased revenue they'll enjoy in 2014 as a result of MLB's new national television contract. Cano, Tanaka, and Garza would all supplement, not block, the core of prospects making its way to Chicago in the coming years.
The club should actually have even more spending flexibility in 2014 than it may have had without its international shopping spree in 2013. Thanks to the additions of teens Eloy Jimenez, Gleyber Torres, Jen-Ho Tseng, Jefferson Mejia, Erling Moreno, and Johan Matos, the Cubs spent at least $7.8M on international amateur signing bonuses in 2013. While the team will still spend internationally in 2014, their expected bonus outlay is severely restricted by the $250K maximum bonus that the team may offer as a result of the new CBA. Thus, expect the Cubs to spend something like $2M-$3M on amateur targets. If the team also signs two compensation free agents like Cano and Granderson, the Cubs would forfeit their 2nd and 3rd round draft picks and the corresponding bonus pool allocation. Accounting for slight inflation, those picks would be worth about $1.3M and $720K. Taken together, the team would have about $7M less to spend on amateur talent in 2014 than it did in 2013, cash that may be reallocated to other avenues.
There's one additional factor that must be considered having looked at all of the above: the financial state of the team. Much has been made of the heavily debt-financed purchase of the team by the Ricketts family. Thus, any available figures should be taken with a very large grain of salt. Nonetheless, Forbes currently values the Cubs as MLB's fourth most valuable franchise at a value of $1B. The team's 2013 revenue of $274M also ranked fourth. The $32.1M operating income ranked first (although you may wisely question the utility of operating income). Unfortunately, the club also ranks first in a much less appealing category: debt-to-value ratio. The 58% figure is one of just three at 50% or higher and many clubs are in the single digits or at 0%.
Still, the team's revenue increases have been largely immune to the on-field product, increasing steadily from $156M to $274M over the past decade that included a pair of division flags and a quartet of top-10 draft picks.
The team doesn't have to spend its money this offseason and it most likely won't. But don't confuse yourself: it's not crazy to think that they have the resources to do so while fitting acquisitions squarely into gaping holes in the short- and long-term plans. The rule of thumb of baseball payrolls is to spend roughly 50% of revenue. Applying that figure would leave the Cubs with a $137M payroll in 2014, plus half of any gains.
Still think a $152.8M payroll is crazy?
Monday, December 2, 2013
Chicago Cubs Offseason Wish List
Like every fan, I want the Cubs to win, and I'd prefer that the team do so sooner rather than later. I also recognize that building a championship level team takes time, unless the Cubs are interested in a Dodgers-style free-for-all. Given that the current regime has shown no inclination to spend well beyond the luxury tax threshold (or even close to it for that matter), here's the series of realistic moves I'd like to see the team pursue this winter with an eye toward competing in 2015 and beyond.
I'll start with the move that has a less than 1% chance of happening. I'll then move along assuming that said move does not come to fruition. Unfortunately, I started this list about a week and a half ago, so just take yourself back to mid-November in your mind.
1. Transaction: Sign 2B Robinson Cano for 8 years, $208M
Realistic?: <1%
Rationale: The pendulum finally seems to have swung too far against free agent talent. Three factors are dominating the discussion on Cano. First, the $310M figure floated by his apparently inept representation. Second, the reluctance of seemingly every team to commit big dollars to players into their mid-30s. Third, everyone appears resigned to the reality that Cano will not leave the Bronx.
Here's why folks are off base: Cano is different. He's not different in that he won't age. Of course he will age. Barring a deluge of HGH in his tap water, Cano's talent will fade over time. Paying $26M to a 37-year-old Cano doesn't sound appealing. So what exactly makes Cano different? His position. Cano is no Darwin Barney with the glove, but he's a very capable second baseman. Whereas Albert Pujols and Josh Hamilton clog up first base and corner outfield spots with their rapidly declining bats, Cano fills the much weaker keystone. Even if he regresses to the point that he is a league average bat, he does so at a position with below average offensive output league-wide. Obviously, if he continues to hit, he is only that much more valuable given the scarcity of quality bats at second base. He does not offer speed, so his bat needs to carry the load. But who better to bet on than a high average, low strikeout, average walk, high power second baseman? Cano also fits beautifully given the Cubs' plethora of big, right-handed power bats coming up through the system. Arismendy Alcantara represents the only viable second base solution, and he's hardly enough to justify passing on Cano.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: It won't happen because of cash. There are lots of reasons to be wary of the Cubs as big spenders. The Ricketts family heavily debt-financed their purchase of the squad: the Cubs are one of only five teams with a debt-to-value ratio of at least 40% and they lead the league at 58% (they're also 4th in revenue and 1st in operating income). Theo Epstein and Jed Hoyer may be completely smitten with the concept of building exclusively from within. Or perhaps the team prefers next offseason's crop of targets (if so, that's a poor decision). Whatever the reason, the club isn't willing to spend the amount necessary to nab Cano. I wish they would: it's not my money and he's a marquee talent with tremendous positional value.
More importantly, at some point this offseason, other clubs will realize that Cano has shifted from unattainable at $310M to eminently in play at $200M. When that happens, bidding will heat up and Cano should be able to nab something like 9 years, $245M. The Cubs aren't going to go that high.
2. Transaction: Trade 3B Luis Valbuena to the New York Yankees for a low-level prospect
Realistic?: 100%
Rationale: The Yankees find themselves in a holding pattern at the hot corner. Alex Rodriguez may very well be their everyday third baseman next year; he may also ride off into the shunned sunset, never playing another game at Yankee Stadium. In either scenario, Valbuena makes plenty of sense for the Bombers. Valbuena provides exceptional defense with the ability to play (a presumably adequate) second base if necessary. Offensively, he is batting average challenged, but draws enough walks to get on base adequately with good power to the pull side. To recap, he's a glove-first, lefty third baseman with solid pull power. He was built for the Yankees, either as a hedge against A-Rod or a perfect bridge from A-Rod to the team's next big third baseman. Valbuena comes with the added bonus of depressed salary given that his primary attribute - his defense - is traditionally undervalued in the arbitration process. For a team screaming about the luxury tax, Valbuena represents an excellent all-around fit.
For a team that struggled to fill the third base spot for decades after the departure of Ron Santo, the Cubs find themselves completely stocked at the position. The team's top two prospects - Javier Baez and Kris Bryant - may both see third base in their defensive futures. On top of that duo, Mike Olt (AAA), Christian Villanueva (AA), and Jeimer Candelario (A) all rank among the club's better prospects. With so many potential options and a window that opens later rather than sooner, Valbuena is a placeholder. Given that he is not in the club's long-term plans, the team would be well served to flip him while his value is decently high. While Valbuena wouldn't figure to bring back much in a deal - think a lesser Corey Black-type - perhaps the Cubs could get creative. The Cubs could easily absorb the $3M the Yankees owe Vernon Wells into their 2014 payroll, even if the club simply released Wells upon completing the deal. Offering Brian Cashman the chance to improve his third base spot while pulling off a net payroll deduction? That might just pry a decent prospect, someone like Jose Campos after his elbow issues have darkened his prospect star.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: This move makes too much sense to me. I haven't been able to talk myself out of it. Valbuena is a safe acquisition for the Yankees as a hedge against departures from A-Rod and/or Cano. The Cubs don't need Valbuena and would be well served to cash in on his late-20s peak performance. I think that this move will happen because the Cubs recognize their logjam at third base while the Yankees appreciate the need for cheaper, productive infield talent even if the ceiling is low.
3. Transaction: Trade OF Albert Almora to Miami Marlins for SP Andrew Heaney
Realistic?: 10%
Rationale: This one is simple: the Cubs are flush with positional talent without pitching depth. The Marlins have Christian Yelich and Jake Marisnick pushing to the Majors but no other positional talent, yet the franchise is loaded with pitching. Why not take a bit from each team's surplus to even out the distribution among positions?
*Disclaimer: I haven't liked Almora since before we drafted him. It kills me that the club took such a low ceiling player at #6 with such an obvious need for pitching. Almora is described as a guy who can reach .290/.340/.450 lines with average center field defense and some running ability. Yipee? I'd right the wrong from draft day 2012 and flip the ninth and sixth picks.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: Teams just don't make prospect-for-prospect deals. They just don't. This one makes about as much sense as any you can imagine. My mind tingles with expanding the possibilities (Almora and Alcantara to Miami for Heaney and Jose Urena?). But I realize the unlikelihood.
4. Transaction: Trade SP Jeff Samardzija to the Toronto Blue Jays for pitching prospects
Realistic?: 50%
Rationale: The Cubs presumably would have locked Samardzija into a new deal by now if one was coming. Samardzija has bet on himself and appears to be in line to cash in as a result of going year-to-year. So the team can deal him for pieces that fit the window of contention a bit better and offer a higher overall value.
The rationale for Toronto is even simpler: they're already all-in. After last season's blockbusters with the Marlins and Mets, Toronto has to show something big this year. As it stands, the Jays don't have the rotation horses to do it. Enter a strong #2 option in Samardzija. Shark enables them to fill out their staff to complement their intriguing offense.
Much like the Marlins, the Jays possess a bevy of arms that should interest the Cubs. Aaron Sanchez figures to be off limits, although any deal that includes Sanchez is worthwhile for the Cubs. I'd be surprised to see Samardzija-for-Sanchez straight up, but any pieces coming back beyond Sanchez are gravy to me. Assuming Sanchez sticks with the Jays, a deal including any pair of the following sextet of arms should be enough to entice the Cubs: diminutive 2012 top pick Marcus Stroman, big teen Roberto Osuna, polished high-floor lefty Sean Nolin, massive lefty Matt Smoral, tiny big-armed righty Alberto Tirado, and recovering lefty Daniel Norris.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: I think it is likelier than not that Samardzija gets traded this offseason. Operating in that reality, only a small handful of teams genuinely possess the right combination of win-now approach and pitching depth to match up with the Cubs. The Diamondbacks have the prospects, but I question whether they actually have the need for Samardzija. The Yankees could actually be a strong match for the Cubs with premium prospect catcher Gary Sanchez possibly available in light of Brian McCann's new deal and power arm Jose Ramirez making progress. But the Jays are still the best match of desperation and talent, and I can see the regime flipping Samardzija if it means 12 controllable years of Norris and Osuna.
5. Transaction: Sign one of the second-tier free agent starting pitchers among Matt Garza, Ricky Nolasco, and Ubaldo Jimenez
Realistic?: 20%
Rationale: Last offseason's signing of Edwin Jackson was an admission: the Cubs had no pitching in their system. In order to compete at the highest level, the team needs some pitching.
That's where one of these pitchers comes in. If the Cubs do trade Samardzija, the rotation will have only Jackson, Travis Wood, Jake Arrieta, Justin Grimm, Carlos Villanueva, Chris Rusin and Kyle Hendricks to fight for spots. While that group isn't exciting for 2014, it isn't any more exciting for 2015. While the farm figures to have a few arms pushing for jobs by then, the likes of Pierce Johnson and Neil Ramirez aren't likely to push for All-Star bids. As I mentioned earlier, championship level teams are built over time and this group of free agent starters offers the ability to add a helpful arm for only cash. Garza figures to obtain the highest commitment (4 years, $72M) while Nolasco will be paid as a plus innings eater (4 years, $60M) and Jimenez is this winter's biggest wild card (anywhere from 3 years, $40M to 5 years, $90M). My preference is for Garza given his ceiling while Jimenez at least intrigues.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: I could see any of these additions from the Cubs perspective. But for the player? The money will have to escalate quite a bit to justify a guaranteed year (or more) of losing during the player's prime. There's also heavy risk with Garza (injuries) and Jimenez (velocity). Strangely, I don't think any of these signings are more or less likely depending on what happens with Samardzija.
6. Transaction: Sign CF Jacoby Ellsbury for 7 years, $141M
Realistic?: 15%
Rationale: This one is really simple. The Cubs have tons of bats coming that can play in the infield or in the outfield corners. But in center? If you like Albert Almora, I suppose he could fill that role. I'm just not a believer, so give me Ellsbury. He should slot into the franchise seamlessly given the need for a top-of-the-order bat, a plus outfield defender, and some speed. Any of the club's hitting prospects should fit 2-5, but none of them are all that great atop the lineup. Ellsbury just makes too much sense.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: That's a lot of money for a speed/defense/on-base center fielder in his 30s. The Red Sox have given almost no indication that they plan to retain Ellsbury, a puzzling move for the franchise given what he has meant to them over the years. Power isn't truly a part of his game - his 2011 outburst notwithstanding - and dollars tend to follow homers. Realistically, there are a lot of reasons for this move to happen, but other teams need an impact performer too. I'm not sure that the Cubs will be willing to top the market.
7. Transaction: Tender 2B Darwin Barney for 1 year, $2M
Realistic?: 99%
Rationale: The Cubs need to play someone at second base this year and the non-Barney internal options are...uninspiring. Barney's 2013 offensive output was mortifying to be sure. However, he is bound to improve on those numbers in 2014. His price tag remains reasonably low. More importantly, he can be flipped this summer.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: It's going to happen. The best-case scenario for the club with Barney involves a few months of health with a regressed BABIP leading to a poor offensive line like .260/.305/.350. If Barney pumps out that line with his elite defense at second base, there should be some market for him, at which point the team will have spent about $1M to obtain a low-level prospect. That's not a bad move.
8. Transaction: Sign This Year's Scott Kazmir for 1 year, $500K....or Sign Last Year's Scott Kazmir for 2 years, $15M
Realistic?: 20%
Rationale: The Cubs are still in desperate need of pitching, so finding high upside arms is the top priority this winter. Finding a formerly successful starter who has fallen on hard times makes plenty of sense. The name that came to mind was Texas' Colby Lewis, a formerly solid mid-rotation arm carved up over the last couple of years.
Then again, last year's Scott Kazmir, Scott Kazmir himself, would make plenty of sense even at a much higher cost. Kazmir is a huge lefty power arm, something the Cubs have lacked since...well, forever? Kazmir comes with considerable risk but also considerable upside.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: Strangely, it seems as though the club might avoid this type of pitcher in the aftermath of the Scott Baker 2013 experience. I think they'll go after a somewhat safer option to avoid this level of risk.
9. Transaction: Sign a Couple of Cheap Relivers
Realistic?: 99%
Rationale: The team needs pitching. That includes relief pitching. Grabbing arms from outside the organization makes plenty of sense.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: It's going to happen. I don't think we'll see this regime spend heavily on relief pitching anytime soon. Spending lightly? Certainly.
10. Transaction: Bid $65M for the Right to Negotiate with SP Masahiro Tanaka, then Sign Him for 6 years, $65M
Realistic?: 5%
Rationale: It's the same thing as all of the above pitching explanations: the Cubs need big-time pitching and lots of it. Unfortunately, there's so little talent in the organization that they really can't afford to give up their inexpensive prospect talent in order to acquire said pitching talent. So, instead, they should utilize one resource that should give them a sizable advantage over most of their peers: cash. The Cubs can buy their way into Tanaka. It's possible that a $65M posting fee will be inadequate to secure his services. Regardless, the team has the chance to acquire an MLB-ready 25-year-old #3 or better starter for only cash. Such opportunities are exceedingly rare.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: I think that the Cubs will place a very competitive bid on Tanaka, likely extending beyond $40M in an attempt to negotiate with the hurler. I just don't know if they're got the resources to outbid the Yankees or Dodgers. Unfortunately for the Cubs, those two clubs have a twisted incentive to spend lavishly bidding on Tanaka in lieu of paying an established MLB starter like Garza because the posting fee will not count against the luxury tax. The Cubs are well under the tax threshold, so this factor cuts against the team. I'll be stunned but ecstatic if the Cubs manage to win the bidding for the right to pay Tanaka.
I'll start with the move that has a less than 1% chance of happening. I'll then move along assuming that said move does not come to fruition. Unfortunately, I started this list about a week and a half ago, so just take yourself back to mid-November in your mind.
1. Transaction: Sign 2B Robinson Cano for 8 years, $208M
Realistic?: <1%
Rationale: The pendulum finally seems to have swung too far against free agent talent. Three factors are dominating the discussion on Cano. First, the $310M figure floated by his apparently inept representation. Second, the reluctance of seemingly every team to commit big dollars to players into their mid-30s. Third, everyone appears resigned to the reality that Cano will not leave the Bronx.
Here's why folks are off base: Cano is different. He's not different in that he won't age. Of course he will age. Barring a deluge of HGH in his tap water, Cano's talent will fade over time. Paying $26M to a 37-year-old Cano doesn't sound appealing. So what exactly makes Cano different? His position. Cano is no Darwin Barney with the glove, but he's a very capable second baseman. Whereas Albert Pujols and Josh Hamilton clog up first base and corner outfield spots with their rapidly declining bats, Cano fills the much weaker keystone. Even if he regresses to the point that he is a league average bat, he does so at a position with below average offensive output league-wide. Obviously, if he continues to hit, he is only that much more valuable given the scarcity of quality bats at second base. He does not offer speed, so his bat needs to carry the load. But who better to bet on than a high average, low strikeout, average walk, high power second baseman? Cano also fits beautifully given the Cubs' plethora of big, right-handed power bats coming up through the system. Arismendy Alcantara represents the only viable second base solution, and he's hardly enough to justify passing on Cano.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: It won't happen because of cash. There are lots of reasons to be wary of the Cubs as big spenders. The Ricketts family heavily debt-financed their purchase of the squad: the Cubs are one of only five teams with a debt-to-value ratio of at least 40% and they lead the league at 58% (they're also 4th in revenue and 1st in operating income). Theo Epstein and Jed Hoyer may be completely smitten with the concept of building exclusively from within. Or perhaps the team prefers next offseason's crop of targets (if so, that's a poor decision). Whatever the reason, the club isn't willing to spend the amount necessary to nab Cano. I wish they would: it's not my money and he's a marquee talent with tremendous positional value.
More importantly, at some point this offseason, other clubs will realize that Cano has shifted from unattainable at $310M to eminently in play at $200M. When that happens, bidding will heat up and Cano should be able to nab something like 9 years, $245M. The Cubs aren't going to go that high.
2. Transaction: Trade 3B Luis Valbuena to the New York Yankees for a low-level prospect
Realistic?: 100%
Rationale: The Yankees find themselves in a holding pattern at the hot corner. Alex Rodriguez may very well be their everyday third baseman next year; he may also ride off into the shunned sunset, never playing another game at Yankee Stadium. In either scenario, Valbuena makes plenty of sense for the Bombers. Valbuena provides exceptional defense with the ability to play (a presumably adequate) second base if necessary. Offensively, he is batting average challenged, but draws enough walks to get on base adequately with good power to the pull side. To recap, he's a glove-first, lefty third baseman with solid pull power. He was built for the Yankees, either as a hedge against A-Rod or a perfect bridge from A-Rod to the team's next big third baseman. Valbuena comes with the added bonus of depressed salary given that his primary attribute - his defense - is traditionally undervalued in the arbitration process. For a team screaming about the luxury tax, Valbuena represents an excellent all-around fit.
For a team that struggled to fill the third base spot for decades after the departure of Ron Santo, the Cubs find themselves completely stocked at the position. The team's top two prospects - Javier Baez and Kris Bryant - may both see third base in their defensive futures. On top of that duo, Mike Olt (AAA), Christian Villanueva (AA), and Jeimer Candelario (A) all rank among the club's better prospects. With so many potential options and a window that opens later rather than sooner, Valbuena is a placeholder. Given that he is not in the club's long-term plans, the team would be well served to flip him while his value is decently high. While Valbuena wouldn't figure to bring back much in a deal - think a lesser Corey Black-type - perhaps the Cubs could get creative. The Cubs could easily absorb the $3M the Yankees owe Vernon Wells into their 2014 payroll, even if the club simply released Wells upon completing the deal. Offering Brian Cashman the chance to improve his third base spot while pulling off a net payroll deduction? That might just pry a decent prospect, someone like Jose Campos after his elbow issues have darkened his prospect star.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: This move makes too much sense to me. I haven't been able to talk myself out of it. Valbuena is a safe acquisition for the Yankees as a hedge against departures from A-Rod and/or Cano. The Cubs don't need Valbuena and would be well served to cash in on his late-20s peak performance. I think that this move will happen because the Cubs recognize their logjam at third base while the Yankees appreciate the need for cheaper, productive infield talent even if the ceiling is low.
3. Transaction: Trade OF Albert Almora to Miami Marlins for SP Andrew Heaney
Realistic?: 10%
Rationale: This one is simple: the Cubs are flush with positional talent without pitching depth. The Marlins have Christian Yelich and Jake Marisnick pushing to the Majors but no other positional talent, yet the franchise is loaded with pitching. Why not take a bit from each team's surplus to even out the distribution among positions?
*Disclaimer: I haven't liked Almora since before we drafted him. It kills me that the club took such a low ceiling player at #6 with such an obvious need for pitching. Almora is described as a guy who can reach .290/.340/.450 lines with average center field defense and some running ability. Yipee? I'd right the wrong from draft day 2012 and flip the ninth and sixth picks.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: Teams just don't make prospect-for-prospect deals. They just don't. This one makes about as much sense as any you can imagine. My mind tingles with expanding the possibilities (Almora and Alcantara to Miami for Heaney and Jose Urena?). But I realize the unlikelihood.
4. Transaction: Trade SP Jeff Samardzija to the Toronto Blue Jays for pitching prospects
Realistic?: 50%
Rationale: The Cubs presumably would have locked Samardzija into a new deal by now if one was coming. Samardzija has bet on himself and appears to be in line to cash in as a result of going year-to-year. So the team can deal him for pieces that fit the window of contention a bit better and offer a higher overall value.
The rationale for Toronto is even simpler: they're already all-in. After last season's blockbusters with the Marlins and Mets, Toronto has to show something big this year. As it stands, the Jays don't have the rotation horses to do it. Enter a strong #2 option in Samardzija. Shark enables them to fill out their staff to complement their intriguing offense.
Much like the Marlins, the Jays possess a bevy of arms that should interest the Cubs. Aaron Sanchez figures to be off limits, although any deal that includes Sanchez is worthwhile for the Cubs. I'd be surprised to see Samardzija-for-Sanchez straight up, but any pieces coming back beyond Sanchez are gravy to me. Assuming Sanchez sticks with the Jays, a deal including any pair of the following sextet of arms should be enough to entice the Cubs: diminutive 2012 top pick Marcus Stroman, big teen Roberto Osuna, polished high-floor lefty Sean Nolin, massive lefty Matt Smoral, tiny big-armed righty Alberto Tirado, and recovering lefty Daniel Norris.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: I think it is likelier than not that Samardzija gets traded this offseason. Operating in that reality, only a small handful of teams genuinely possess the right combination of win-now approach and pitching depth to match up with the Cubs. The Diamondbacks have the prospects, but I question whether they actually have the need for Samardzija. The Yankees could actually be a strong match for the Cubs with premium prospect catcher Gary Sanchez possibly available in light of Brian McCann's new deal and power arm Jose Ramirez making progress. But the Jays are still the best match of desperation and talent, and I can see the regime flipping Samardzija if it means 12 controllable years of Norris and Osuna.
5. Transaction: Sign one of the second-tier free agent starting pitchers among Matt Garza, Ricky Nolasco, and Ubaldo Jimenez
Realistic?: 20%
Rationale: Last offseason's signing of Edwin Jackson was an admission: the Cubs had no pitching in their system. In order to compete at the highest level, the team needs some pitching.
That's where one of these pitchers comes in. If the Cubs do trade Samardzija, the rotation will have only Jackson, Travis Wood, Jake Arrieta, Justin Grimm, Carlos Villanueva, Chris Rusin and Kyle Hendricks to fight for spots. While that group isn't exciting for 2014, it isn't any more exciting for 2015. While the farm figures to have a few arms pushing for jobs by then, the likes of Pierce Johnson and Neil Ramirez aren't likely to push for All-Star bids. As I mentioned earlier, championship level teams are built over time and this group of free agent starters offers the ability to add a helpful arm for only cash. Garza figures to obtain the highest commitment (4 years, $72M) while Nolasco will be paid as a plus innings eater (4 years, $60M) and Jimenez is this winter's biggest wild card (anywhere from 3 years, $40M to 5 years, $90M). My preference is for Garza given his ceiling while Jimenez at least intrigues.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: I could see any of these additions from the Cubs perspective. But for the player? The money will have to escalate quite a bit to justify a guaranteed year (or more) of losing during the player's prime. There's also heavy risk with Garza (injuries) and Jimenez (velocity). Strangely, I don't think any of these signings are more or less likely depending on what happens with Samardzija.
6. Transaction: Sign CF Jacoby Ellsbury for 7 years, $141M
Realistic?: 15%
Rationale: This one is really simple. The Cubs have tons of bats coming that can play in the infield or in the outfield corners. But in center? If you like Albert Almora, I suppose he could fill that role. I'm just not a believer, so give me Ellsbury. He should slot into the franchise seamlessly given the need for a top-of-the-order bat, a plus outfield defender, and some speed. Any of the club's hitting prospects should fit 2-5, but none of them are all that great atop the lineup. Ellsbury just makes too much sense.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: That's a lot of money for a speed/defense/on-base center fielder in his 30s. The Red Sox have given almost no indication that they plan to retain Ellsbury, a puzzling move for the franchise given what he has meant to them over the years. Power isn't truly a part of his game - his 2011 outburst notwithstanding - and dollars tend to follow homers. Realistically, there are a lot of reasons for this move to happen, but other teams need an impact performer too. I'm not sure that the Cubs will be willing to top the market.
7. Transaction: Tender 2B Darwin Barney for 1 year, $2M
Realistic?: 99%
Rationale: The Cubs need to play someone at second base this year and the non-Barney internal options are...uninspiring. Barney's 2013 offensive output was mortifying to be sure. However, he is bound to improve on those numbers in 2014. His price tag remains reasonably low. More importantly, he can be flipped this summer.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: It's going to happen. The best-case scenario for the club with Barney involves a few months of health with a regressed BABIP leading to a poor offensive line like .260/.305/.350. If Barney pumps out that line with his elite defense at second base, there should be some market for him, at which point the team will have spent about $1M to obtain a low-level prospect. That's not a bad move.
8. Transaction: Sign This Year's Scott Kazmir for 1 year, $500K....or Sign Last Year's Scott Kazmir for 2 years, $15M
Realistic?: 20%
Rationale: The Cubs are still in desperate need of pitching, so finding high upside arms is the top priority this winter. Finding a formerly successful starter who has fallen on hard times makes plenty of sense. The name that came to mind was Texas' Colby Lewis, a formerly solid mid-rotation arm carved up over the last couple of years.
Then again, last year's Scott Kazmir, Scott Kazmir himself, would make plenty of sense even at a much higher cost. Kazmir is a huge lefty power arm, something the Cubs have lacked since...well, forever? Kazmir comes with considerable risk but also considerable upside.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: Strangely, it seems as though the club might avoid this type of pitcher in the aftermath of the Scott Baker 2013 experience. I think they'll go after a somewhat safer option to avoid this level of risk.
9. Transaction: Sign a Couple of Cheap Relivers
Realistic?: 99%
Rationale: The team needs pitching. That includes relief pitching. Grabbing arms from outside the organization makes plenty of sense.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: It's going to happen. I don't think we'll see this regime spend heavily on relief pitching anytime soon. Spending lightly? Certainly.
10. Transaction: Bid $65M for the Right to Negotiate with SP Masahiro Tanaka, then Sign Him for 6 years, $65M
Realistic?: 5%
Rationale: It's the same thing as all of the above pitching explanations: the Cubs need big-time pitching and lots of it. Unfortunately, there's so little talent in the organization that they really can't afford to give up their inexpensive prospect talent in order to acquire said pitching talent. So, instead, they should utilize one resource that should give them a sizable advantage over most of their peers: cash. The Cubs can buy their way into Tanaka. It's possible that a $65M posting fee will be inadequate to secure his services. Regardless, the team has the chance to acquire an MLB-ready 25-year-old #3 or better starter for only cash. Such opportunities are exceedingly rare.
Why It Will/Won't Happen: I think that the Cubs will place a very competitive bid on Tanaka, likely extending beyond $40M in an attempt to negotiate with the hurler. I just don't know if they're got the resources to outbid the Yankees or Dodgers. Unfortunately for the Cubs, those two clubs have a twisted incentive to spend lavishly bidding on Tanaka in lieu of paying an established MLB starter like Garza because the posting fee will not count against the luxury tax. The Cubs are well under the tax threshold, so this factor cuts against the team. I'll be stunned but ecstatic if the Cubs manage to win the bidding for the right to pay Tanaka.
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