Chicago Cubs: The Second Basemen

NOTE: Before this look at the second basemen in the organization, I want to note that I am fully aware of the shenanigans surrounding the Anibal Sanchez near-signing last week. I'm also fully aware that the Cubs signed Edwin Jackson yesterday. With that in mind, there will be an out-of-order post on Jackson specifically in the coming days, followed by the rest of this series in its regular order.

Second Base

2012 Overview: After looking at the rather destitute catching situation in the organization and the extremely strong first base spot, second base unsurprisingly falls somewhere in the middle.

Second year starter Darwin Barney was handed the job without competition to begin the year and managed to keep his job all season, playing in 156 games. In many respects, he was exactly the player that most Cubs followers and prospect hounds expected him to be. He played stellar defense, producing an incredible 13 runs above average with his glove. Among the 22 keystone men who qualified for the batting title, Barney tied Washington's Danny Espinosa for the league lead defensively. Unfortunately, among those same 22, Barney placed 21st in wRC+ as an appalling 75 (25% worse than an average MLB batter). While he somehow muscled out seven home runs, he floundered to a .254/.299/.354/.653 line, showing an inability to draw walks while his paltry .100 ISO set a career high for a full season. Still, on the strength of strong baserunning and elite defense, Barney's 2.5 WAR placed him 13th of 22 among qualified second basemen.

Adiran Cardenas and Blake DeWitt also both saw some time at 2B. While with the Cubs, DeWitt never showed any of the promise that made him a first round pick. He was completely incapable of hitting at Iowa and in Chicago. Similarly, Cardenas has proven to be a replacement player: a guy who plays very well in the upper minors but simply cannot match up with major league pitching. The future isn't completely dark for Cardenas though after a .300/.381/.461/.842 showing at Iowa in half a season. His thriving at AAA will continue to get him looks.

Fellow Iowa 2B Alfredo Amezaga and Matt Tolbert define organizational fodder as older minor leaguers without major league skill sets. Amezaga did an adequate job reaching base in 2012, but he lacked the power or speed to contribute much.

In contrast to the complete lack of talent behind Barney at the upper levels, Tennessee's Logan Watkins put together yet another strong campaign. The 2008 21st round pick showed a balanced, developed offensive approach for the second straight season with a 130 wRC+ over almost 600 AA plate appearances. Watkins continued to draw walks at a very high rate, earning a free pass on 12.9% of his trips to the plate. While this was an improvement, he walked at 10% over his previous two years at Peoria and Daytona, so it was hardly a fluke. His ISO also improved for the third straight season reaching a solid .141. Helping that ISO was a career high nine home runs. He set yet another career mark with 28 stolen bases, up from 21, 19, and 14 the previous three seasons. In reaching a .281/.383/.422/.805 line, Watkins announced himself as a player in contention for major league playing time as early as 2013. Although he has enjoyed consistently high BABIPs in his career - at least .330 each year - his offensive profile is well positioned to absorb a BABIP drop as he progresses with his ability to walk, steal bases, and hit for (some) power. He did just turn 23 this August, so he cannot afford to slip up.

Down in Daytona, Ronald Torreyes experienced one of the most precipitous drops in BABIP that I have ever seen. The former Reds farmhand who came to Chicago along with Travis Wood and Dave Sappelt in exchange for Sean Marshall followed a .374 BABIP in 2011 with a .268 total in 2012. His fantastic 2011 year was driven almost exclusively by his .356 batting average. Although that number dropped to .264 in 2012, his other abilities did show some improvement as his ISO jumped from .101 to .121, his walk rate rose from 4.6% to 6.8%, and he managed those improvements while maintaining his miniscule 6.1% strikeout rate. Torreyes has shown some ability to steal bases but at just 13 swipes in a full season, speed is unlikely to be a big part of his game. Regardless, the peripheral improvements keep Torreyes on the radar, as does the fact that he just turned 20 three months ago.

Two men split the second base job at Peoria: 2011 third round pick Zeke DeVoss and 2009 fifth rounder Wes Darvill. Despite power not being a major part of his game, DeVoss has displayed an off-the-charts ability to draw walks following a 19% in his short-season debut with a 14.1% total in his full-season debut. DeVoss also swiped 34 bags. Unfortunately, the switch-hitting former center fielder from Miami has a problem with strikeouts. While it is possible for a player like DeVoss to have a major league career, it's difficult for a player who has a 20%+ strikeout rate with only six home runs in his first 768 professional plate appearances. The speed and walking ability will need to carry him at every level. If he finds a way to continue getting on base at a .382 clip despite just a .249 batting average, he will stick around for a while.

Darvill has a much different background. The 2009 fifth rounder hails from British Columbia and has a much bigger frame (6'2", 175 lbs.) than DeVoss. Unfortunately, the production hasn't been there for Darvill. He has shown no power, little speed, and a complete inability to get on base thus far in his career. It's too early to give up on a player who just completed his age-20 season and made his full-season debut, but some pieces need to show themselves this season.

Rounding out the organization is perhaps the most exciting member of this group, Boise's Gioskar Amaya. Amaya turned 20 last week, but just finished his third year of at least 50 professional games. He has progressed nicely in his young career, producing a very strong stint this year with a 147 wRC+ (.298/.381/.496/.877) that showcased the diversity of his skill set. He swiped 15 bases, erupted for eight home runs despite having just one total entering the year, and walked in 10.4% of his plate appearances. He did suffer an uptick in his strikeout rate up to 20.5%, but the other skills make that increase palatable.

2013 and Beyond: It's a bizarre group. Barney's offensive profile is poor, but his defensive expertise could make him a valuable trade chip this summer. Watkins has been trending up as he approaches a major league debut and could find himself auditioning for the 2014 job this summer. Both Torreyes and DeVoss face important years: struggles could force them off of the prospect map while some growth could have them heading toward Chicago in the next year or two. With all of that said, Amaya's full-season debut is the thing to watch at this position. He could have the skill set to burst onto the prospect scene.

Overall Perception: Frankly, it's not a terribly exciting position, but it should nonetheless be interesting to follow in 2013. Any of the four best players mentioned above - Watkins, Torreyes, DeVoss, and Amaya - have the chance to lay claim to the "second baseman of the future" title with a strong year. But it still seems unlikely that there is an impact player in the bunch.

Final Rating: 3.0

Why You Should Be Excited to See Anibal Sanchez With the Cubs

As I'm writing this, it remains largely a toss-up as to whether Sanchez will accept the five-year, $75M offer from the Cubs that it was reported he had already accepted a couple of hours ago. Poor reporting by Bog Nightengale and Jim Bowden gave Cubs fans a premature feeling of hope. But as it appears as though the bidding for Sanchez's services is down to the Cubs and Detroit Tigers, I think it's appropriate to take a look at what a Sanchez signing would mean for the franchise. I recognize that this breaks form with my methodical position-by-position tour of the organization; for that, I hope you will forgive me.

The History
Sanchez was signed by the Boston Red Sox out of Venezuela in 2001. In 2002 he injured his elbow and subsequent Tommy John surgery forced him to miss the entire 2003 season. He responded in a big way, bursting onto the prospect scene in 2004. By the end of the year, he trailed only Hanley Ramirez, Brandon Moss, Jonathan Papelbon, and Jon Lester on Boston's top prospect lists. After a similarly excellent 2005 campaign in the minor leagues, Sanchez co-headlined the trade with the Florida Marlins that sent Josh Beckett and Mike Lowell to Boston.

Sanchez finally reached the major leagues in mid-2006. He punctuated his strong rookie season with a September no-hitter. Unfortunately, his 2007 year ended in June with surgery to repair a torn labrum. He returned on deadline day in 2008, struggling with his command the rest of the way (4.7 BB/9) but racking up plenty of strikeouts (8.7 K/9). He struggled through another half-season in 2009 with his command still a problem.

Then 2010 began. Sanchez turned in the finest season of his career, cutting his BB/9 from 4.81 in 2009 all the way down to 3.23 BB/9. He maintained a solid strikeout rate (7.25 K/9) and rode an incredibly lucky lack of home runs allowed to a career-best 4.4 WAR, a tally that tied him for 19th in all of baseball.

Sanchez proved 2010 was no fluke by turning in a strong encore in 2011. He further cut down on his walks (2.93 BB/9) while enjoying a strong uptick in strikeouts (9.26 K/9). A return to his normal home run rate led to a 3.8 WAR season, 28th in MLB. For comparison, the five pitchers ranked immediately ahead of him were Tim Hudson, Edwin Jackson, Zack Greinke, Tim Lincecum, and Josh Beckett.

In a contract year, Sanchez submitted yet another good season. His strikeout rate returned to be more in line with his career rate (7.68 K/9 in 2012) while he further sliced his walk rate (2.21 BB/9). With another 3.8 WAR, Sanchez tied for 20th in baseball with Matt Harrison, teammate Josh Johnson, and Matt Cain.

Just before the trade deadline, he was part of another blockbuster deal. The Marlins dealt Sanchez and second baseman Omar Infante to the Detroit Tigers for a competitive balance draft pick and a trio of minor league players headlined by starting pitcher Jacob Turner, Detroit's top prospect and baseball's 15th best overall prospect. Sanchez struggled to adjust in his first four starts. But after allowing five runs in five innings in Minneapolis in mid-August, Sanchez was electric over his final eight outings, throwing 54.1 innings, allowing 46 hits with just seven walks and 44 strikeouts as the Tigers rolled toward the post-season. In the playoffs, Sanchez continued his strong pitching, going 20.1 innings over three starts, allowing 14 hits with six walks and striking out 18.

To synthesize his past past and to show where he is right now, Sanchez dealt with a pair of injuries (elbow, shoulder) early on in his major league career. But over the last three seasons, he has been durable and incredibly steady. His ERA and FIP have been remarkably consistent, as has his strikeout rate save for the surprising upswing in 2011. His walk rate has trended steadily downward.

2010: 32 starts, 195 IP, 3.55 ERA, 3.32 FIP, 7.25 K/9, 3.23 BB/9
2011: 32 starts, 196.1 IP, 3.67 ERA, 3.35 FIP, 9.26 K/9, 2.93 BB/9
2012: 31 starts, 195.2 IP, 3.86 ERA, 3.53 FIP, 7.68 K/9, 2.21 BB/9

The Pitcher
Let's get something out of the way: Anibal Sanchez is not an ace. And that's okay.

Anibal Sanchez is a very, very good pitcher. He turns 29 this February and just completed his third consecutive season of at least 31 big league starts; from 2006-2009, he made an additional 49 starts bringing his total to 144 thus far. Over that time, he has harnessed his arsenal and seriously improved his command. At this stage of his career, he throws four pitches at roughly the same rates each season.

Like most pitchers, Sanchez relies on his fastball. He threw it just 47.6% of the time in 2012, the first time in his career that the total dropped below 52%. He has been throwing his fastball less and less as a major leaguer, likely a result of his improved command of his secondary offerings. The average speed - 91.8 mph - is basically average among qualified starters. During the playoffs, he routinely dialed it up to 94 and occasionally hit 95. His slider remained his main secondary pitch in 2012 at 23.2%, almost exactly his career average. It is a hard, downward breaking pitch that he throws in the 85-87 range. He also throws a curveball, although he has not thrown it more than 10% of the time since 2008. On the other hand, while he seldom used his changeup early in his career, he began to rely on the pitch rather heavily in 2009 and he now throws the pitch almost as frequently as his slider and twice as frequently as the curveball. The changeup is in the low-to-mid 80s with downward movement somewhat similar to the slider.

This video, from perhaps the most important regular season start of his career, does a nice job showcasing his arsenal (strange banner ads aside). The fastball is a rather straight delivery, but the slider and changeup both fool hitters pretty badly.

In addition to his stuff, Sanchez enjoys some success because of his delivery itself. He rotates just past 90 degrees in his windup and reaches the ball back just behind his back. However, the ball disappears from view again as it passes by his torso. His mechanics are deliberate and their fluidity seems to cause his pitches to jump on batters.

As a final note, the Venezuelan is unafraid to show his emotions while pitching, although Cubs fans need not worry about the emotional outbursts of former ace Carlos Zambrano. Overall, Sanchez appears rather levelheaded.

The Contract
As it was first reported, the deal was for five years and $75M. Obviously a lot can change between that report and the actual contract being signed, including the team with whom he agrees. In addition to the Tigers and Cubs, the Angels appear to be a natural fit given their need for starting pitching and win-now approach with the signing of Josh Hamilton to complement Albert Pujols and MVP runner up Mike Trout. Regardless, we'll work with the five year, $75M framework.

It's a good contract. It's not exactly a steal for the Cubs. It's also not a fleecing by Sanchez. It's a fair deal given the market, even if I'm surprised Sanchez didn't obtain $80M or even $85M over five years. There are two different methods I'll use to evaluate the terms: the value of a marginal win above replacement level and the market forces in baseball's free agency.

First, given player salaries in baseball, the value of a marginal win is roughly $5M. Thus, a player who produces $15M worth of wins would be a roughly 3 WAR player. Sanchez has been better than that. He has been worth $17.5M, $17.1M, and $17M over the last three seasons according to Fangraphs' dollars conversion. Given Sanchez's production thus far, the Cubs are paying slightly less than would be expected. But it's close enough to be nearly a wash.

However, Sanchez isn't simply a player producing wins: he's a free agent being signed on the open market to produce those wins. Teams obtain marginal wins from players making insanely different amounts of money. For example, Starlin Castro produced 3.3 WAR for the Cubs last year while Alfonso Soriano produced 4 WAR. Because he was in the final year of his pre-arbitration eligibility, Castro made $567K. Conversely, because he was in the sixth year of his eight year free agent deal, Soriano made $19M. Needless to say, cheap talented players are the most efficient resource in the game.

For a free agent like Sanchez (and like Soriano before him), they get the advantage of having teams compete for their services, driving up the price (this is likely happening for Sanchez as we speak). The Cubs would be paying $15M annually for Sanchez's age 29-33 seasons. This and the past couple of off-seasons only present a couple of comparable pitchers to Sanchez. Let's look at each:

Zack Greinke. Greinke signed with the free-spending Dodgers for six years, $147M ($24.5M average annual value (AAV)). Greinke is just four months older than Sanchez, so they're good comparisons by age, but not as much by reputation. Greinke's super-elite 2009 Cy Young campaign largely set the market for the player and he has been extremely durable since 2008. However, over the past three seasons, Greinke has produced 14.2 WAR compared to 12 for Sanchez. Despite Greinke's higher ceiling, the production gap will not match the pay gap.

Edwin Jackson. After signing a one year, $10M deal last off-season, Jackson struggled a bit for the Nationals, but still produced a solid year. Coming off of a three year span where he tallied 11.4 WAR, Jackson was worth 2.7 last season. His peripheral numbers remain similar to Sanchez's and it remains to be seen what type of contract the righty nets this winter. Regardless, as Jackson just finished playing for his seventh team, it's clear that something is scaring franchises away.

Mark Buehrle. Buehrle may actually be the strongest comparison on the market. After spending 12 seasons with the White Sox, Buehrle bolted for what turned out to be a one-year stay in Miami. He signed a four year, $56M ($14M AAV) deal with the Marlins. Buehrle is a different type of pitcher than Sanchez with low strikeout totals but he has also shown incredibly low walk rates and amazing durability. In the three seasons before free agency, Buehrle was worth 10.9 WAR. He signed for his age 33-36 seasons.

Brandon McCarthy is a poor comparable: he is coming off of skull surgery and has been much less consistent. Last winter, C.J. Wilson obtained a five year, $77.5M contract, but he is older than Sanchez and has only been a starting pitcher for two years.

Given the similar pitchers, $15M per year is about right for an arm like Sanchez. And give his age, Sanchez represents a safer bet than someone like Buehrle.

What It Means for the Cubs
It means (and doesn't mean) a number of things.

First, it means that Theo Epstein and Jed Hoyer recognize the complete lack of pitching the in Cubs system. The 30 starts Sanchez would make wouldn't just be starts made by a good starter; they'd also be starts not made by a poor starter. 30 Sanchez starts would represent starts not made by the likes of Chris Volstad, Justin Germano, and Jason Berken. There aren't any big arms in the minor leagues coming to help in the next year or two, so help from the outside is a necessity for competing.

Second, it does not mean that the plan is any different. As I see the system, the plan is to be bad in 2013, better in 2014, and competitive in 2015 and beyond. While the offense has a combination of players who could form the core of a contender by 2015, the pitching does not. Between the tandem of Jeff Samardzija and Matt Garza and the raw arms in rookie ball, only Trey McNutt, Rob Whitenack, and Nick Struck seem even remotely capable of playing a role in the major leagues, but all three have major flaws. McNutt has stalled out with command problems in AA, Whitenack is recovering from Tommy John surgery, and Struck lacks any impact pitches although he has been a steady producer. In order to compete in 2015, the starting pitching needs to add at least two reliable arms in addition to Samardzija and Garza assuming the unlikely event that both are still Cubs in 2015. Sanchez would be one of those arms and he would still be just 31 in 2015.

Third, it speaks volumes about the 2014 free agent class. This year, there were supposed to be three big pitching prizes in free agency: Cole Hamels, Zack Greinke, and Matt Cain. Both Hamels and Cain re-signed with their respective teams mid-season, leaving only Greinke to the market. In 2014, the Cubs' own Garza, Josh Johnson, Tim Lincecum, and Johan Santana make up the under-35 impact group. There are some other interesting names like Dan Haren (33), Phil Hughes (28), Colby Lewis (34), and Ricky Nolasco (31). However, beyond Garza and Johnson, the free agent market figures to offer no arms that are even the same quality as Sanchez, much less better alternatives. If the Cubs are seeking 2015 rotation pieces, this off-season is the time to do it.

Fourth, Epstein appreciates the value of adding talent via free agency. All things being equal, it's infinitely better for a team with the Cubs' financial resources to obtain talent via free agency than to do so via trade. There were some comments this morning that the Cubs could be well positioned to make a trade for Rays ace David Price next off-season. While I would celebrate David Price's arrival in Chicago, if the cost is Javier Baez, Dan Vogelbach, and Jorge Soler, what offense is going to produce runs behind Price? For some teams, the scarce resource is cash. For others, the scarce resource is talent. For the November 2012 Cubs, the scarce resource is undeniably the latter.

Fifth and finally, I think Epstein appreciates the impact of the new collective bargaining agreement on the baseball draft. Under the previous CBA, teams like the Yankees and Epstein's Red Sox would load up on old talent at the trade deadline, offer those players arbitration, then stock up on compensation draft picks that fell between the first and second rounds. This method became so pervasive that the compensation round last almost as long as a regular round. Last year, the Cubs first round pick was #6 overall; however, their second round selection came at #68! With the new CBA in place, fewer free agents require compensation picks, thus improving the overall positioning of later picks. This year, a team that signs a player requiring compensation loses their own first round pick with the team that lost the player obtaining a compensatory selection after the first round. The top ten picks are protected, but a team with a top ten pick (like the Cubs) that signs a player requiring compensation loses their second round pick. The current draft order is:

First Round: 1-29 (Pittsburgh receives #9 overall for failure to sign 2012 #8 overall Mark Appel; the Angels (Josh Hamilton) and Braves (BJ Upton) lose their picks for signing qualified free agents)
Competitive Balance Round A: 30-35 (new selections added for small market teams by lottery: KC, PIT, ARZ, BAL, CIN, MIA)
Compensation Round: 36-37 (Tampa Bay (Upton), Texas (Hamilton))
Second Round: 38-67

If the four remaining qualified free agents re-sign with their current teams, the Cubs second round pick would be #39 overall, a full 23 spots higher than the second pick of last year's second round. While Adam LaRoche may find himself back in Washington, it seems unlikely that Kyle Lohse, Rafael Soriano, or Nick Swisher return to their current teams, and completely implausible that Michael Bourn joins Upton in the Atlanta outfield. Still, the Cubs pick is likely to be in the early 40s in a spot that was formerly Epstein's favorite location: the early portion of the compensation round. With draft picks no more valuable, the cost of signing a qualified free agent has increased even for a team with a protected top ten pick. Unlike Josh Johnson next off-season, Anibal Sanchez does not cost the Cubs a draft pick. When stockpiling talent, early draft picks are essential.

Final Thought
Anibal Sanchez is a good pitcher. The Cubs need good pitchers but don't have very many of them. The Cubs do, however, have lots of money. Anibal Sanchez costs only money, not talent. Signing Anibal Sanchez is an excellent idea. I sure hope the Cubs are just a pawn in his master plan to scratch a few more million dollars out of Tigers owner Mike Illitch. Here's hoping.

Chicago Cubs: The First Basemen

First Basemen
2012 Overview: While the catching situation went from shaky to dire in 2012, first base could not have been more different. After elite 1B Derrek Lee held down the position from 2004-2010, stopgap Carlos Pena enjoyed a solid 2011 at the position with little hope of being a long-term solution. With Pena out of the picture, Jed Hoyer and Theo Epstein got creative in filling a spot where a homegrown option hadn't truly been developed since Mark Grace (no hard feelings, Hee Seop Choi).

After three straight years of eviscerating AAA pitching, Bryan LaHair was given an everyday job and ran with the opportunity. He rode an obscene April (.390.471/.780/1.251) and strong May (.253/.343/.448/.792) to a surprise All Star selection. Unfortunately, the wheels came off shortly thereafter and LaHair failed to produce a wRC+ higher than 88 after May, unacceptably poor production from an offense-only first baseman. Already 29 and having posted a stunningly decrepit .292 OPS versus left-handed pitching, LaHair was unlikely to be a long-term solution himself. He slipped into obscurity before producing a season-ending walk-off single.

Largely due to LaHair's vicious splits, utility man Jeff Baker found himself receiving a handful of starts at first. However, Baker's traditional lefty-mashing bat failed him, making him largely an afterthought in a deadline trade to Atlanta.

Thankfully, in the offseason, Hoyer and Epstein made a splashy move, trading 2008 first-round pick pitcher Andrew Cashner and outfielder Kyung-Min Na to San Diego for 1B Anthony Rizzo and pitcher Zach Cates. Those who have followed the story know about the many acquisitions of Rizzo, but for those who haven't heard it, here's a brief timeline for your amusement:

2007: Rizzo is drafted in the sixth round by Theo Epstein (GM) and Jed Hoyer (Assistant GM) of the Boston Red Sox.
2010: Rizzo is traded from Boston (Epstein) to San Diego for Adrian Gonzalez. Hoyer was the new San Diego GM.
2012: Rizzo is traded from San Diego to the Cubs; Epstein is the new Cubs President while Hoyer is the new GM

So, in total, Rizzo has been acquired by Epstein twice, Hoyer three teams, and dealt by Epstein once. Pfew. He also overcame Hodgkin's lymphoma in 2008. Hopefully he's found a place where he can settle in, chaos free.

Rizzo has hit at every level. There's little doubt that his 6'3", 220 lbs. lefty frame can carry big power totals and he has produced a wRC+ of at least 118 at every level except in the majors. Even though, despite his horrendous MLB debut with San Diego in 2011, he posted a strong .285/.342/.463/.805 line for the Cubs in half a season of work this year. He is going to be a liability on the basepaths, but thus far his glove has been an asset. He has the look of a player who could produce .280/.350/.500 lines for the next decade with 30 home runs annually while manning the #3 or #4 spots in the lineup. Concerns over his disastrous Padre debut are largely a thing of the past after his insane .342/.405/.696/1.101 line at AAA was followed with his strong showing for the Cubs. Even when his strikeout rate rises, he should be a strong offensive force in the middle of the lineup. Although he has shown a massive platoon split in the majors, his AAA split was mostly negligible, so like Welington Castillo, the Cubs should give Rizzo an everyday shot before determining that he needs a partner who can hit left-handed pitching. Rizzo has just under one year of major league service time, so he is controllable through 2018.

Largely unknown 2009 21st round pick Greg Rohan turned in another strong season in 2012. On the heels of a .323/.378/.478/.856 showing in 2011 between Peoria and Daytona, Rohan ran his 2012 line to .282/.349/.491/.839 across three levels, from Daytona to Tennessee and finally Iowa. He enjoyed a solid uptick in power, reaching 21 home runs for the season. Unfortunately, I cannot find his righty/lefty splits for 2011 and 2012 (milb.com only has his limited winter league splits). Regardless, as a right-handed hitting first baseman, there's a chance that Rohan - who turns 27 in May - could carve out an unexpected niche for himself as Rizzo's complement, a right-handed bench bat who can pinch hit and spell Rizzo against tough lefties.

Tennessee 1B Justin Bour turned in another solid, if unspectacular, season as he continues to climb the organizational ladder. Bour lacks the kind of impact power often required of first basemen as his .283/.360/.455/.815 line shows, but the 24-year-old has a chance to keep climbing like Rohan, although he may be blocked into another year at Tennessee. Regardless, it's unlikely that Bour will make much of an impact as a major leaguer, even if he makes it as an extra bat.

Daytona 1Bs Richard Jones and Rebel Ridling are non-prospects. Same for Peoria's Ryan Cuneo and Paul Hoilman. Boise's Rock Shoulders could be a useful player, but his development is likely to be extremely lengthy as he learns to harness his power stroke.

The organization's remaining first baseman has had no trouble with his power stroke. Dan Vogelbach, the team's 2011 second round selection out of a Florida high school, has arguably the system's worst baseball body at 6'0" and generously listed at only 250 lbs. Vogelbach blistered rookie league pitching with a 166 wRC+ (.324/.391/.686/1.077), then continued the onslaught upon his call up to Boise for short season ball (189 wRC+: .322/.423/.608/1.031). I'm yet to find a scouting report that questions his bat's ability to play everyday in the majors. The defense and baserunning are another story. It seems unlikely that he will be able to man a position on the diamond, and while he would possess oodles of value as a designated hitter, that value cannot be provided directly to the Cubs. Still, Vogelbach's development will be fun to watch, especially if he gets moved to an outfield corner as an experiment.

2013 and Beyond: 2013 represents the next step in Rizzo's career as he will arrive at Spring Training with a major league starting job waiting for him. I'm certainly hoping that he can improve versus lefties while maintaining his current success versus righties. He should be the long-time first baseman and a reliably above-average or better starter.

The situation in the minors is less clear but plenty interesting. Rohan can make himself into a legitimate MLB bench player with another strong year. Shoulders can make himself into a more interesting prospect with some improvements. And Vogelbach's defense will be tightly followed. There should be plenty of optimism here.

Overall Perception: It's hard to beat having an above-average starter who is just 23 and controllable for six years. Throw in a high-level prospect in Vogelbach and this is a really strong group.

Final Rating: 8.5

Chicago Cubs: The Catchers

Catcher

2012 Overview: Needless to say, 2012 was not a great year for the organization at the catching position. However, it wasn't quite the failure many may assume it was.

Incumbent starter Geovany Soto was unable to continue his run of alternating hot and cold seasons, turning in a second straight clunker. Soto began the season with an horrific .127/.226/.236 April and was unable to produce the type of electric month that had made previous poor seasons more palatable. The dynamic backstop from 2007, 2008, and 2010 now seems a distant memory. With Soto approaching his final season of arbitration eligibility, Jed Hoyer wisely flipped the 29-year-old to Texas for reliever Jake Brigham, who was then sent back to the Rangers for starter Barret Loux after the season (more on him in a future post). The good Soto will be missed, especially by the former catcher in me who loved watching him in '08 and '10. However, that Soto seems unlikely to reappear.

Rookie Steve Clevenger admirably filled in as Soto's backup early in the season. However, when given extended time, Clevenger showed his complete offensive ineptitude, never producing a month with a wRC+ higher than 56 after May (that is, he was always at least 44 percent worse than an average player, a stunning level of failure). While he did produce strong offensive showings at Tennessee and Iowa in 2010 and 2011, those number we always driven by extremely high BABIPs. Power and speed are absent from his game. If he is going to have any type of a career, it will have to be as a defense-first backup who finds enough BABIP to get himself on base. That's highly unlikely and I'd be surprised to see Clevenger with the club in a couple of years.

While Clevenger brought very little to the table, Welington Castillo showed why Soto was legitimately expendable. Castillo produced his third consecutive strong season at Iowa while finally getting an extended look in Chicago. This year, he took advantage, positing a solid .265/.337/.418 line, good for a 101 wRC+, a strong number for a catcher. Although his strikeouts rate climbed to almost 27%, he maintained his ability to draw walks while showing the kind of pop in his bat that should make him a reliably everyday player. His high BABIP (.348) can afford some regression assuming his strikeout rate also drops a few percentage points. He also proved to be just slightly above average defensively, fitting with his reputation. Castillo did show an extreme platoon split, posting a .609 OPS versus right-handed pitching compared to a 1.199 versus lefties. While Castillo has shown a platoon split in the minors as well, his numbers were much closer: .861 versus lefties and .766 versus righties. He may need a left handed partner in the future; for now, he should be given the job to see whether or not that is the case. Expect Castillo to be an average or better defender who also produces average offense for the position, likely from the 7 or 8 spot in the lineup when the team is competitive again.

Blake Lalli, Anthony Recker, and Koyie Hill all made cameos in Chicago. None contributed and none will be with the team going forward.

The club did bring in former All Star Dioner Navarro this offseason to complement Castillo, but the pair seem to be a poor fit. Navarro has traditionally hit lefties at an only average rate while righties have left him befuddled. After a precipitous slide from 2009-2011, Navarro resurfaced as a competent bat for the Reds in 2012. If he plays well, his one year, $1.75M contract seems likely to be shopped in July.

A number of non-prospects got some playing time for the club's various affiliates in 2012. Juan Apodaca split the year between Tennessee and Iowa; while he draws a lot of walks, he has no power and thus needs a very strong batting average to contribute. That hasn't been present in his four-stop career. Brian Esposito lacked offensive competence at Iowa. Michael Brenly continued to receive at-bats despite a staggering inability to get on base and middling power. The lower levels are littered with offensively inept catchers.

The most disappointing development in the minors was the failure of 2010 third-round pick Micah Gibbs. While he was hardly expected to be an offensive spark plug, he floundered to a .200/.338/.297 line as a 24-year-old at Daytona (High-A). Thankfully, one player did hold his own with the bat at the lower levels: 2012 ninth-round selection Chadd Krist from Cal-Berkeley. Between Boise and Peoria, Krist put together a .274/.335/.433 line with 24 extra base hits in 234 plate appearances. It's far too soon to project Krist, but it is nice to see someone produce at the plate.

2013 and Beyond: Castillo and Navarro figure to get most of the time behind the plate for the team in 2013. While they are hardly the cream of the crop, a number of teams will employ less desirable options behind the dish. Castillo has what it takes to be an average MLB catcher and to do so in the very near future. As he turns 26 in April and is controllable through 2017, Cubs fans should hope to see a lot of him.

Cubs fans should also hope that Castillo succeeds because the cupboard is bare behind him. Gibbs's failure to develop means that the organization will almost certainly be looking to the outside for Castillo's backup in the future or for his starter if Welington cannot handle the job.

Overall Perception: This is quite possibly the worst position in the organization. Castillo is the only redeeming player in the entire system, although his proximity to an everyday major league job rescues the group from the abyss. Still, with seemingly just one MLB-caliber player in an entire organization who can hope to be an average player, it's a really ugly picture.

Final Rating: 0.5

An Introduction to Our Journey Through the Cubs System

This will be the first in an X part series on the Cubs. I say X parts because I have no idea how big this is going to get right now, so I want to leave things open in case that number is four or 15.

The basic premise is straightforward: in order to get an in-depth look at the team, I'm going to look at the organization position-by-position and evaluate the strength of the group relative to other organizations.

As I am prone to do, I'll be using an inflation-less grading scale. I'm using a scale of 0 to 10. 0 represents complete, abject failure where there is only the slimmest of fanciful hope of a remotely useful major league regular coming from in house. Think the Rockies pitching situation for much of their existence or the Cubs third base situation in the years prior to the acquisition of Aramis Ramirez. 10 represents baseball's elite, with a star level major league player and talent in the pipeline. Think the Phillies when Ryan Howard was biding his time in the minors behind Jim Thome.

I'll discuss the players based on where the primarily played last season. For example, although Dave Sappelt had a cup of coffee in Chicago in September and ended the year there, I'll refer to him as the AAA centerfielder given the vast majority of the season he spent there. This area can get fuzzy, but we'll discuss all of the relevant players regardless.

Finally, a (long) note on statistics. For offensive players, I'll use the basic counting stats (HR, 2B, 3B, XBH, SB), the triple slash line with OPS thrown on for good measure (Batting Average/On-base Percentage/Slugging Percentage/On-base Plus Slugging), and a couple of additional numbers that need a bit of explanation:

1. BABIP. Batting Average on Balls in Play. League average tends to be around 30%, although batters tend to experience more variation than pitchers. Some of this is due to a player's particular skill set. For example, Adam Dunn has an exceptionally low BABIP (.270) for his career given that he is very slow and a large number of his hits - home runs - are not actually in play and thus not factored into BABIP. Conversely, slap hitting Emilio Bonifacio has a sky-high .335 career BABIP. However, for many players, a notable amount of BABIP variation is due to luck. Thus, when a player who traditionally bats .260 unexpectedly turns in a .320 season, an unsustainable BABIP is often the source.

2. wRC+. To poach almost verbatim from Fangraphs, Weighted Runs Created Plus attempts to quantify a player's entire offensive value and measure it by runs. The wRC metric uses the traditional stats and spits out a synthesized number for easy consumption. wRC+ compares a player's wRC with league average with each point above or below 100 (league average) representing one percentage point above or below league average. For example, a 125 wRC+ means that the player created 25% more runs than league average. By way of illustration, this list shows players who were within one point of each threshold number:

166: Miguel Cabrera, Mike Trout (they actually tied)

125: Adam Jones, Carlos Beltran, Andre Ethier

110: Jose Reyes, Ryan Doumit

100: Rickie Weeks, Brett Lawrie, Starlin Castro

90: Jesus Montero, Mike Moustakas

75: Darwin Barney, Yunel Escobar

64: Drew Stubbs

Put simply, wRC+ gives us a good sense of a player's overall offensive production and a way to provide context for the more traditional numbers. It also speaks to positional value: while Starlin Castro's 99 wRC+ is effectively perfectly league average, that production as a shortstop plays up because of the scarcity of quality offensive shortstops. The bottom of this list is, unsurprisingly, littered with middle infielders and free-swinging corner outfielders with low BABIPs.

For pitchers, I'll use a number of easily understood statistics and a pair of slightly more confusing ones. I'll look at a quartet of rate stats: K/9, BB/9, and HR/9. I'll also look at BABIP from the other perspective (pitchers tend to be closer to the .300 average than hitters). I'll even include ERA. As for the less familiar numbers:

1. FIP. Fielding Independent Pitching likes to examine how well a pitcher does getting positive results over the plays for which he has the most control, specifically strikeouts, walks, hit by pitchers, and home runs. FIP is used more as a predictive tool. To steal the calibration directly from Fangraphs:

2.90: Excellent (MLB's four sub-3.00 FIPs in 2012: Gio Gonzalez, King Felix, Kershaw, Verlander)

3.25: Great (Johnny Cueto, R.A. Dickey)

3.75: Above Average (Jake Peavy, Jered Weaver)

4.00: Average (Paul Maholm)

4.20: Below Average (James McDonald, Mark Buehrle)

4.50: Poor (Barry Zito)

5.00: Awful (Ubaldo Jimenez)

(Ervin Santana brought up the rear at 5.63)

2. xFIP. Expected FIP is much like FIP, only different in that it replaces a pitcher's home run total with an estimate of how many home runs he should have allowed given his fly ball rate and the league average fly ball rate. xFIP helps when looking at pitchers in parks where the ball never leaves (San Diego) and those where it always leaves (Arizona).

The very last statistic is one that many of you will be familiar with: WAR. Wins Above Replacement has been popular for some time now and multiple outlets have their own version. The simple idea is that WAR is a complete measure of a player's value, combining offense, defense, and baserunning to show how many wins that player added above a bench player or minor leaguer, the comparative replacement player. For example, a player with a 3.5 WAR provides his team with 3.5 wins more than a fringe major leaguer would be expected to provide. One win correlates with roughly ten runs. To be clear, WAR is NOT predictive; it only measures the actual value a player has already provided in a given season. Additionally, it is not a rate statistic. For example, Matt Garza produced just 1.2 WAR last season even though he had a 4.17 FIP because he missed half of the season with an injury. Players with similar FIPs like Justin Masterson and Mark Buehrle produced 2.3 and 2.1 WAR respectively by virtue of pitching the full season. The basic concept being illustrated: two players of equal production on a per game basis are not equal; the player who contributes more innings at that rate contributes more overall to the team. This isn't necessarily always better. If the Marlins were giving starts to Buehrle instead of R.A. Dickey or Justin Verlander, it's a poor allocation of innings. However, the Cubs pitching Garza instead of Chris Volstad is an unquestioned success.

I'll use the following basic format for evaluating each position group:

Position

2012 Overview: A look back at what happened during the 2012 season in the position group including on-field performance, injuries, transactions, and scouting reports.

2013 and Beyond: I'll lean more heavily on scouting reports here and examine the overall health of the position group, particularly its depth in the minor leagues.

Final Rating: A number to give a good sense of the position.

Please refer back to this post in the future if you have questions. We'll get started with the catchers shortly.

The Chicago Cubs: An Introduction to the Organizational Plan

I'm feeling painfully disheartened by the Bears in light of last weekend's collapse versus the surprisingly hated Seahawks. As if a home loss to a team with a 1-5 road record entering the game wasn't bad enough, Brian Urlacher, Tim Jennings, and Earl Bennett were all lost to injuries that should keep them out for a couple of games. Saddest of all, it appears as though the end of the line is rapidly approaching for Urlacher. The man was an absolute joy to watch, cheer for, and follow. Here's hoping he's got some magic left in those legs for January.

But I digress. The Winter Meetings are upon as, and as the baseball world overwhelms Opryland, I just can't stop thinking about the Cubs. This happens every year around this time. I start trying to figure out what combination of Jason Schmidt and Brian Giles will assure a five-year run of division titles (glad I wasn't the GM for that one). Or I try to convince all of my friends and family that Ted Lilly would be an ideal target (nailed it!). Or I try to talk myself into Zack Greinke coming in to lead a surprisingly strong rotation (still working on that - not like it's going to happen but still).

This year feels a bit different than most years past. Generally, the Chicago club is decent enough that either minor tweaks or one big splash could propel them to October. Obviously, that is not so this year.

But the even bigger difference lingers beneath the surface: the Cubs have some actual prospects. To be fair, the pitching crop is full of raw arms (Pierce Johnson, Duane Underwood, Juan Carlos Paniagua), stalled out developers (Trey McNutt), and unprotected likely Rule 5 draft picks (Nick Struck - why Theo?).

The hitters are a different story. At this time last year, I was hoping for three things: 1) that Javier Baez would do enough in 2012 for me to have hope for a 19-year-old high schooler, 2) that the Cubs would sign Cuban free agent outfielder Jorge Soler, and 3) that the club would bring in an impact player - preferably a pitcher - with the sixth overall pick in the 2012 draft.

We went two for three, but the two both happened in a big way. I'll look at each individually.

Baez
The book on Javier Baez is pretty clear. He's probably going to be able to stick at shortstop, but he won't be an above-average defender there. No problem. He isn't going to impress with gaudy walk numbers as he climbs the organizational ladder. He is, however, going to make loud contact and lots of it. If you skip to the :40 mark of this video, you'll see a bomb to center. Similarly, at 1:10 of this one, the explosion in his bat is obvious. When baseball people think Gary Sheffield when watching you play, that's a good thing. In his full-season debut, Baez put up a combined line of .294/.346/.543 with 16 HR, 13 2B, 6 3B, and 24 (of 29) SB in 80 games. Needless to say, that kind of production screams of an impact player. Baez will get another crack at Daytona (A+) to begin 2013, but I imagine he'll spend at least half of the season at Tennessee (AA) unless things go horribly wrong at Daytona. If he has a huge year, a September cup of coffee isn't entirely out of the question. Realistically, Cubs fans should expect to see Baez at Wrigley Field in the late summer of 2014, permanently arriving to start 2015. As of now, he has the look of a middle-of-the-order bat.

Soler
I was senselessly excited by the prospect of bringing in Soler. As many of you know, with the new Collective Bargaining Agreement severely limiting the amount that teams can pay in bonus money to foreign prospects, Soler and fellow defector OF Yasiel Puig represented the last two prizes of the pre-capped international market. The Cubs did well to nab Soler for nine years and $30M, especially in light of Puig inking with the Dodgers for seven years and $42M days later. Soler is the classic power-hitting corner outfield prospect. He has a big, muscular frame, yet he runs well given his size (it is likely that, if he adds the 20 pounds of expected weight in the next couple of years, the speed aspect of his game will largely dissipate). As Soler cost only cash (unlike acquiring players via trade or signing free agents that formerly required draft pick compensation), I was ecstatic about the investment. And he delivered as well. In 34 games at the rookie level and for Peoria (A), Soler put up a line of .299/.369/.463 with 5 HR, 7 2B, and 12 (of 13) SB. Much like Baez, the thing that stands out most about Soler is the noise. When he connects cleanly on a pitch, the sound is mesmerizing. The sound of the crack on this bomb is far less impressive due to crowd noise surrounding the videographer, but the reaction of the fans makes clear what the video of a ball flying over a deck in left field already conveys: there is a ton of power in Soler's game. Soler is 10 months older than Baez, but given his adjustment to the United States and professional baseball here, I expect that Soler will be on a similar timetable, beginning perhaps with a short sting at Kane County (new A affiliate) this year before moving up to Daytona. If all goes well, he could reach Tennessee before the end of the season, placing himself in position for a trip to Chicago in 2014 in advance of a 2015 full-time job.

Almora
Teams can't be perfect. That's not to say that I am either. But entering draft day 2012, I had a list of players about whom I would be particularly excited to obtain with the #6 selection: RHP Kyle Zimmer (went #5 to KC), SS Carlos Correa (went #1 to HOU), RHP Mark Appel (went #8 to PIT - bonus concerns), OF Byron Buxton (went #2 to MIN), RHP Lucas Giolito (went #16 to WSH - injury concerns) and RHP Kevin Gausman (went #4 to BAL). By draft day, the one player under consideration to which I had a serious aversion was Almora. From every single scouting report I can find, Almora projects to be something like Shane Victorino. Not Victorino's incredible 2011 season; the rest of Victorino's fine career. Almora is expected to play a strong center field, hit for average power (15-20 HR), steal a handful of bases (15-20), hit for solid average, and draw enough walks to get on base well. Overall, if Almora reaches his widely-held projection, he will be a strong player to add to the fold. I'll enjoy his contribution. However, I just cannot get on board with the Almora selection. When drafting at #6, the team needs to seek out a true impact player, the kind that costs $20M+ on the open market, not a $10-12M player. That doesn't even mention the system's desperate need for impact pitching (to be fair, the Cubs' seven subsequent picks were all used on pitchers). Almora's projections just don't convey enough hope in me that he will be able to impact games. It's possible that Theo Epstein and Jed Hoyer view him as a possible leadoff man with good pop and excellent defense, a table setter for Starlin Castro, Anthony Rizzo, Baez, and Soler. I just hate that the #6 overall pick comes with such a low ceiling. He did hit well in his debut where he split between the rookie league and Boise (A-) posting a line of .321/.331/.464 with 2 HR, 12 2B, 1 3B, and 5 SB (of 7) in 33 games. He just doesn't offer much on which to hope.

It's obviously much too early to be so bullish on Almora. I realize that. While I believe that his pre-pitch movement is much too extreme, he is years of development away from Chicago. He could be a perennial All-Star by the time my children are thinking about applying for college. That's the nature of drafts: you tend to like some guys more than you should and others less so.

In the coming months, I will do a more in-depth look at the system, examining position groups to see which will need the most help in the future and which appear relatively stable. For now, hopefully this introduction whets your appetite.